People v. Rouse, 171 N.E.3d 584

Defendant William A. Rouse II was convicted at jury trial of three counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to three consecutive 6‑year terms (total 18 years).
At the jury‑instruction conference the trial court indicated attempted ACSA was an appropriate lesser‑included offense; defense counsel declined to request attempt instructions and the defendant agreed.
In a pro se postconviction petition, Rouse alleged trial counsel misadvised him that attempted ACSA sentences (4–15 years each) would be mandatory consecutive (total 12–45), so he rejected the lesser‑included instruction; he claimed he would have requested it had he known they could be concurrent (total 4–15).
The trial court appointed postconviction counsel, who filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and declined to amend the pro se petition; defendant later sought to discharge postconviction counsel and proceed pro se for the second‑stage hearing.
The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the second‑stage petition, finding defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel’s alleged advice and that his waiver of postconviction counsel was knowing and voluntary.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was ineffective for advising that attempted ACSA sentences would be consecutive, causing defendant to forgo a lesser‑included attempt instruction	Even assuming counsel gave worst‑case advice, the evidence of actual penetration was strong; defendant cannot show prejudice because a rational jury would convict of the greater offense	Counsel told Rouse attempted counts would run consecutively (12–45) and failed to tell him they could run concurrently (4–15); had he known, he would have requested attempt instructions and there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome	Affirmed dismissal: defendant failed to show prejudice — record evidence established penetration "however slight," so no reasonable probability the jury would have convicted only of attempt; court did not need to decide deficient performance
Whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to postconviction counsel to proceed pro se	The waiver was knowing and voluntary: the court admonished defendant under Rule 401, counsel had filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and was prepared to argue, and defendant’s pro se filings showed legal sophistication	Defendant contends he felt forced to go pro se because postconviction counsel refused to amend or respond in writing and thus his waiver was not voluntary	Affirmed: waiver was knowing, voluntary, and unequivocal; counsel had provided the assistance required by Rule 651(c)

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Pendleton v. State, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006) (treats as true all well‑pleaded facts not rebutted by record at second stage)
Enis v. State, 194 Ill. 2d 361 (2000) (application of Strickland in Illinois criminal cases)
Hall v. State, 217 Ill. 2d 324 (2005) (second‑stage postconviction dismissal standard)
Coleman v. State, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998) (scope of relief under the Post‑Conviction Hearing Act)
Lesley v. State, 2018 IL 122100 (2018) (no constitutional right to postconviction counsel; waiver and Rule 651(c) standards)
Parsons v. State, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1049 (1996) (defendant entitled to lesser‑included instruction only if rational basis exists to acquit of the greater offense)
Stewart v. State, 406 Ill. App. 3d 518 (2010) (no prejudice from failing to give lesser instruction when evidence for greater offense is strong)
McClellan v. State, 232 Ill. App. 3d 990 (1992) (failure to give lesser instruction requires reversal only if defendant shows prejudice)