People v. Rosales CA6, H045615

Background

In July 2011 a drive‑by shooting in a Target parking lot killed Gustavo Diaz Zargoza and wounded Esparanza Salazar; defendant Cesar Rosales was the front‑seat passenger and Miguel Rodriguez the driver. Rodriguez testified for the prosecution as an accomplice.
Physical evidence included four expended .357 Magnum casings in a Jack‑In‑The‑Box bag on the passenger floor, a Jack‑In‑The‑Box receipt, and a .357 Ruger later tied ballistically to the fatal bullet; DNA from partially eaten food in the bag matched Rosales.
Witnesses described a green Honda, a front‑seat passenger firing a revolver, and the driver having a red neck tattoo (consistent with Rodriguez).
Rosales was convicted of special‑circumstance murder (gang‑murder), shooting from a vehicle, assault with a deadly weapon, and active gang participation; sentenced to LWOP plus 55 years‑to‑life.
On appeal Rosales raised multiple claims: insufficiency of corroboration for accomplice testimony and for the gang‑murder special circumstance; admission/authentication and pretrial‑relevance objections to social‑media photos/videos; several ineffective‑assistance claims (including failure to present voluntary‑intoxication evidence and failure to object to prosecutorial comments); challenge to CALCRIM No. 315 (eyewitness certainty); juror bias; Eighth Amendment and Dueñas (ability to pay) challenges to sentencing and fines.

Issues

Issue	People’s Argument	Rosales’s Argument	Held
Sufficiency of corroboration for accomplice (§1111)	Rodriguez’s testimony was corroborated by Rosales’s out‑of‑court admissions, eyewitness accounts, physical evidence (casings, receipt), and DNA linking Rosales to the passenger seat.	Rodriguez was the sole source tying Rosales to the shooting; corroboration was insufficient and conviction must be reversed.	Affirmed. Court found independent corroboration (admissions to A.R., eyewitnesses, DNA, ballistic evidence) reasonably tended to connect Rosales to the crimes.
Corroboration for gang‑murder special circumstance (§190.2(a)(22))	Either §1111 does not apply to motive‑type special circumstances (Hamilton/Avila), or even if it did, independent evidence (gang contacts, tattoos, victim perceived as rival, expert opinion on gang benefit) corroborated the gang motive.	Rodriguez’s testimony alone proved the gang motive; insufficient independent corroboration for the special circumstance.	Affirmed. §1111 does not apply to this motive‑type special circumstance; alternatively, corroboration was sufficient.
Admission/authentication of Instagram photos and YouTube videos	Social‑media materials were relevant to gang membership and properly authenticated by the detective; admissible under §352.	Photos/videos were unauthenticated, remote in time (2016–17), cumulative and unduly prejudicial; should have been excluded.	Affirmed. Rosales forfeited foundational/authentication and §352 objections at trial; counsel’s failure to preserve objections did not establish ineffective assistance given tactical alternatives and overwhelming evidence.
Counsel ineffective for failing to elicit voluntary‑intoxication evidence / request instructions	No request necessary; scant evidence of intoxication and no proof intoxication affected mens rea.	Counsel should have elicited witness testimony about drug/alcohol use and requested CALCRIM on voluntary intoxication.	Denied. Record shows no established tactical reason to fault counsel and no prejudice because no evidence intoxication impaired intent.
CALCRIM No. 315 eyewitness‑certainty instruction	Instruction is proper and did not lower burden; jury told attorneys’ remarks are not evidence.	Instruction invited jurors to rely on witness certainty (unreliable) and violated due process.	Denied. Claim forfeited; in any event California Supreme Court upheld CALCRIM 315 (Lemcke).
Prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal (translation of “sangrón” and arguments about Rosales letting Rodriguez take the fall)	Remarks were fair comment on the evidence (van recording, jail van statements) and argumentative; not prejudicial.	Prosecutor misstated evidence (translation not in record) and misled jury about Rosales’ culpability given his later confession; counsel ineffective for not objecting.	Denied. The translation remark was improper but defense counsel reasonably declined to object; no prejudice given strength of evidence and brief nature of comment. Prosecutor’s inference about Rosales’ conduct was a permissible argument on the record (van statements).
Juror bias based on student report of juror saying defendant would be convicted	Any contact was benign/transitory and jurors denied the conversation on inquiry; no evidence of juror prejudice.	A juror expressed a pretrial opinion to a student and should have been excused; verdict tainted.	Denied. Trial court’s implied finding of no misconduct is supported by substantial evidence (student’s inaccuracies; jurors’ denials). No reasonable probability of prejudice.
Cumulative prejudice from errors	Errors (if any) were harmless individually and do not cumulatively require reversal.	Multiple errors and omissions cumulatively deprived Rosales of a fair trial.	Denied. No reversible errors to aggregate.
Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory LWOP (defendant was 19)	Miller and its progeny apply only to defendants under 18; Rosales was an adult and sentence was mandatory under §190.2.	Young‑adult status and maturity evidence warrant sentencing discretion; LWOP is cruel and unusual for a 19‑year‑old.	Denied. Claim forfeited; on the merits Miller does not apply to 19‑year‑olds—line is at age 18.
Ability to pay / Dueñas challenge to restitution and assessments	Fine and assessments were properly imposed; any objection was forfeited and harmless given LWOP and future earning potential.	Under Dueñas the court must assess ability to pay before imposing court operation/facilities assessments and execution of restitution fine.	Denied. Rosales forfeited Dueñas objections by failing to object at sentencing; any error is harmless.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Rodriguez, 4 Cal.5th 1123 (discussing corroboration principles for accomplice testimony)
People v. Abilez, 41 Cal.4th 472 (corroboration may be slight but must tend to connect defendant)
People v. Gurule, 28 Cal.4th 557 (defendant’s statements and conduct may corroborate accomplice testimony)
People v. Williams, 16 Cal.4th 635 (extrajudicial admissions can corroborate accomplice testimony)
People v. Hamilton, 48 Cal.3d 1142 (distinguishing special‑circumstance corroboration when only motive is at issue)
People v. Avila, 38 Cal.4th 491 (applying Hamilton to motive‑type special circumstances)
People v. Szeto, 29 Cal.3d 20 (corroboration must tend to implicate defendant)
People v. Sánchez, 63 Cal.4th 411 (forfeiture of challenges to eyewitness‑certainty instruction)
People v. Lemcke, 11 Cal.5th 644 (upholding CALCRIM No. 315 instruction)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance standard)