People v. Rosado
2017 IL App (1st) 143741
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2018Background
- Defendant Joe Rosado faced multiple drug-sale charges arising from transactions on March 18, March 23, and March 29, 2011; the March 29 case was tried first and resulted in an acquittal.
- The State then tried Rosado for the March 23 sale; at that trial the State introduced testimony about the March 29 sale as other-crimes evidence to prove identity.
- The trial court admitted the March 29 evidence over Rosado’s objection but refused to allow Rosado to tell the jury he had been acquitted of the March 29 charge.
- Officer Gonzalez (undercover buyer) was the key witness identifying Rosado for the March 23 transaction; other officers provided peripheral surveillance testimony. No physical evidence tied the items or marked money to Rosado.
- The jury convicted Rosado for the March 23 sale; he post-trial challenged admission of the March 29 evidence and the court’s exclusion of his acquittal. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of March 29 testimony as other-crimes evidence (identity) | March 29 sale corroborates officers’ identification and shows a buyer–seller relationship, supporting identity. | March 29 was a later incident and cannot logically bolster identification at an earlier date; admission was more prejudicial than probative. | Reversed: admission was an abuse of discretion — evidence of a later sale did not logically enhance identification and was unduly prejudicial. |
| Exclusion of evidence that defendant was acquitted of March 29 charge | Acquittal was not directly relevant to identity; excluding it was permissible. | Acquittal was highly probative on identification and necessary to give context and fairly impeach the State’s key witness. | Reversed: trial court abused its discretion in excluding proof of the acquittal; acquittal was highly probative on identity and fairness required disclosure. |
| Judicial reassignment on remand | Reassignment not authorized by Rule 366 in criminal cases; appellate court should not direct reassignment. | Reassignment appropriate because trial judge made comments suggesting bias and reversed earlier evidentiary rulings without explanation. | Affirmed reassignment: appellate court may direct reassignment under Rule 366; reassignment warranted to avoid appearance of bias. |
Key Cases Cited
- Placek v. People, 184 Ill. 2d 370 (other-crimes evidence inadmissible to show propensity; must be weighed for probative value vs prejudice)
- Donoho v. People, 204 Ill. 2d 159 (other-crimes evidence admissible for non-propensity purposes like identity but must meet probative-prejudice test)
- Vazquez v. People, 180 Ill. App. 3d 270 (prior earlier sale admissible to bolster identification where it created recognition before the charged sale)
- Bedoya v. People, 325 Ill. App. 3d 926 (reversal where jury was not told defendant had been acquitted of an offense used as other-crimes evidence)
- Ward v. People, 2011 IL 108690 (trial court abused discretion by excluding evidence of prior acquittal where its omission distorted context and prejudiced defendant)
- Castleberry v. People, 2015 IL 116916 (discussion of appellate authority; cited regarding limits of Rule 615 and appellate powers)
