People v. Romero and Self
62 Cal. 4th 1
| Cal. | 2015Background
- In 1992 Romero and Self (brothers) committed a multi‑count crime spree including three murders (Mans, Jones, Aragon), multiple attempted murders, numerous robberies, a burglary/vandalism (Magnolia Center), kidnappings, and receiving stolen property. They were tried jointly before separate juries; both juries returned death verdicts and the trial court entered judgments of death. The appeal to the California Supreme Court was automatic.
- Jose Munoz, a co‑participant, pled guilty to many counts and testified for the prosecution; the trial court instructed Munoz was an accomplice as a matter of law for several counts, triggering the statutory corroboration rule (Pen. Code § 1111).
- Key contested evidence included Munoz’s accomplice testimony, physical evidence tying defendants to shotgun sabot rounds (20‑gauge), jail conduct (escape attempts, weapons, assaults), and victim‑impact testimony at penalty.
- Defendants raised multiple trial and penalty‑phase claims on appeal (juror selection, prosecutorial misconduct, accomplice corroboration, joinder/severance, admissibility of certain evidence, instructional issues, and constitutionality of the capital sentencing scheme).
- The Supreme Court affirmed nearly all convictions and both death sentences, but reversed Self’s conviction for the Knoefler robbery (count XV) for lack of accomplice corroboration and vacated five duplicative multiple‑murder special‑circumstance findings for each defendant; all other claims were rejected or found forfeited.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Romero/Self) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accomplice corroboration for Knoefler robbery | Munoz’s testimony was corroborated by victim testimony and general common scheme evidence | Self argued Munoz was not corroborated as to Knoefler robbery and no evidence tied Self to that crime | Reversed Self’s conviction for Knoefler robbery: Munoz’s testimony lacked independent corroboration connecting Self to that robbery |
| Admission/use of Feltenberger attempted‑murder evidence (receiving count) | Evidence admitted to show property was stolen and Romero’s knowledge; limiting instructions were given | Romero argued the gruesome details were prejudicial at penalty and irrelevant to receiving charge | Admission not reversible: limiting instructions deemed sufficient and any error harmless for penalty; Romero’s receiving conviction stands |
| Joinder and severance of multiple charges (including Magnolia Center and receiving) | Joinder proper because crimes were connected (common element of obtaining property) and evidence was cross‑admissible; no abuse of discretion in denying severance | Defendants argued statutory misjoinder and undue prejudice requiring severance | Claims forfeited or meritless; joinder and denial of severance affirmed as not prejudicial given strength of evidence |
| Duplicative multiple‑murder special‑circumstance findings | N/A | Defendants argued duplicative findings improper | Court agreed the trial instructed duplicatively; vacated five duplicative multiple‑murder special‑circumstance findings for each defendant but found the error harmless as to punishment |
| Jury selection / alleged racial bias and failure to challenge jurors | People relied on voir dire record and stipulations; many claims forfeited by defendants’ failure to object or to use peremptories | Self argued prosecutor used questionnaire and voir dire to remove Hispanic jurors and seated death‑prone jurors | Many selection claims forfeited; no reversible error shown and ineffective‑assistance claims rejected on record |
| Prosecutorial argument on mitigation and future dangerousness | Prosecutor may reasonably argue future dangerousness based on admitted conduct; cannot use expert predictions | Defendants argued prosecutor mischaracterized mitigation, shifted burden, and improperly argued future dangerousness not in §190.3 | Statements found not to require reversal: jury instructions adequately defined mitigation and reasonable doubt; arguing future dangerousness from admitted evidence is permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, 60 Cal.4th 335 (2014) (forfeiture and limits on omnibus joinder/appeals practice)
- People v. Najera, 43 Cal.4th 1132 (2008) (principles on accomplice‑testimony corroboration)
- People v. Abilez, 41 Cal.4th 472 (2007) (corroboration standard: remove accomplice testimony and ask whether remaining evidence tends to connect defendant)
- People v. Bailey, 54 Cal.4th 740 (2012) (attempted escape doctrine and related instruction issues)
- People v. Hartsch, 49 Cal.4th 472 (2010) (joinder and severance principles; preference for joinder and prejudice standard)
- People v. Dykes, 46 Cal.4th 731 (2009) (victim‑impact evidence admissibility and limits)
- People v. Pollock, 32 Cal.4th 1153 (2004) (victim‑impact under §190.3)
- People v. Brown, 46 Cal.3d 432 (1988) (harmlessness standard for penalty‑phase evidentiary errors)