People v. Rogers
57 Cal. 4th 296
| Cal. | 2013Background
- Defendant Glen Rogers was convicted of first-degree murder (Sandra Gallagher) and arson in California; a separate prior first-degree murder conviction in Florida (Tina Cribbs) was alleged as a §190.2(a)(2) special circumstance; jury returned a death verdict.
- Factual pattern: within ~6 weeks Rogers met multiple women in bars in different states, gained their trust, then each was later murdered; evidence showed similar modus operandi (socializing/drinks, luring to secluded place, killing, taking property, fleeing across state lines).
- Two out-of-state murders (Florida and Louisiana) were admitted in the guilt phase under Evid. Code §1101(b) for intent/common plan; a Mississippi murder (Price) was excluded from guilt-phase but admitted at penalty.
- At trial the court excused a prospective juror for cause (expressed categorical opposition to both death and LWOP), and instructed the jury on flight and on other-crimes (CALJIC 2.50 series) including that uncharged crimes may be proven by a preponderance.
- On appeal Rogers raised multiple claims: improper admission of uncharged-murder evidence; erroneous jury instructions (flight, CALJIC No. 2.15 on possession of stolen property, burden/unanimity issues); invalidity of the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance (timing and finality); and penalty-phase evidentiary/instructional claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Rogers) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of Florida & Louisiana murders at guilt phase | Evidence admissible under Evid. Code §1101(b) to show intent and common design; distinctive similarities made them probative | Uncharged murders insufficiently similar; overly prejudicial under §352; identity disputed; offered to stipulate to premeditation | Admitted: similarities and pattern made them probative for intent/common plan; §352 and due process objections rejected; limiting instruction given |
| Excusal for cause of prospective juror No.3156 | Juror’s voir dire showed categorical inability to impose death or LWOP; substantial evidence of impairment supports excusal | Juror’s questionnaire showed only uncertainty, not categorical bias; excusal improper | Affirmed: trial court entitled to assess demeanor; juror’s written and oral answers conflicted and demonstrated substantial impairment |
| CALJIC No. 2.15 (possession of recently stolen property) given on murder/arson theories | Instruction appropriate to explain inferences from possession with corroboration | Instruction improperly allowed conviction based on possession + "slight" corroboration; lightened burden; wrong for non‑theft crimes | Giving CALJIC No.2.15 was error under later precedent for non‑theft crimes, but error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on this record |
| Burden/unanimity re: other-crimes evidence (CALJIC 2.50/2.50.1) | Other-crimes may be proved by preponderance for limited purposes; jury also instructed on reasonable-doubt for charged offenses | Preponderance instruction allowed conviction/special-circumstance by lesser standard | Affirmed: well-established law permits preponderance proof of uncharged acts when combined with standard reasonable-doubt instructions for ultimate guilt and special circumstance |
| Validity of §190.2(a)(2) prior-murder-conviction special circumstance | Special circumstance applies where defendant was "convicted previously"—order of homicides immaterial; statute does not require appellate finality | Special circumstance invalid because the prior murder occurred after the charged murder and the Florida conviction was not yet final on appeal | Affirmed: order of commission immaterial per precedent; "convicted previously" means previously convicted (no additional finality requirement); Florida conviction later affirmed on its own review |
Key Cases Cited
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2007) (trial court deference in juror-bias determinations on death-penalty voir dire)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (U.S. 1985) (juror excusal standard where views would substantially impair duties)
- People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th 380 (Cal. 1994) (standards for admitting other-crimes evidence to prove intent, plan, identity)
- People v. Foster, 50 Cal.4th 1301 (Cal. 2010) (analysis of Evid. Code §1101(b) and §352 balancing for other-crimes evidence)
- People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal.3d 584 (Cal. 1987) (§190.2(a)(2): prior conviction requirement construed; order of homicides immaterial)
- People v. Coffman & Marlow, 34 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2004) (inappropriateness of CALJIC No. 2.15 for non‑theft murder theories)
- People v. Gamache, 48 Cal.4th 347 (Cal. 2010) (discussion of CALJIC No.2.15 error and harmlessness)
- People v. Medina, 11 Cal.4th 694 (Cal. 1995) (other-crimes evidence may be proven by preponderance; instructions read together preserve reasonable-doubt standard)