People v. Rocha, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1385

Background

On March 26, 2011, defendant Manuel Rocha was observed inside the Gonzales family’s open residential garage and was seen leaving carrying a bulky object; officers later found an impact wrench in the abandoned case and other scattered items in the garage. Rocha was arrested after fleeing and identified in a field show-up. A blood sample tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine.
Rocha was charged with first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code §§ 459, 460), receiving stolen property, and obstructing an officer; jury convicted him of burglary and obstructing an officer but acquitted on receiving stolen property. Court struck a prior first-degree burglary conviction for Romero purposes; sentenced to 2 years plus a five-year enhancement; awarded presentence custody credit but dispute arose over parole-hold days.
The prosecutor sought to admit evidence of a 2009 uncharged (but later convicted) burglary of a residential garage in Gilroy in which Rocha allegedly stole speakers from an open garage; trial court admitted it under Evid. Code § 1101(b) to prove larcenous intent, with a limiting instruction (CALCRIM No. 375).
Defense theory was that Rocha lacked larcenous intent—he may have been a confused, homeless, or methamphetamine-impaired wanderer who entered the garage without intent to steal; thus intent was in bona fide dispute.
The trial court ruled the 2009 incident sufficiently similar and probative under the doctrine of chances and Robbins, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudice under Evid. Code § 352. On appeal Rocha challenged admission of the prior burglary and the presentence custody credit calculation; the People conceded the credit issue.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of 2009 burglary under Evid. Code § 1101(b) to prove larcenous intent	2009 and charged burglaries were sufficiently similar (open residential garages, daytime, theft from strangers) so prior act is probative of intent; limiting instruction protects against propensity inference	Incidents were too dissimilar (vehicle vs. on foot, different stolen items, differing evasive conduct) and single prior act lacks substantial probative value; admission was unduly prejudicial	Affirmed. Prior act was "roughly similar," probative under doctrine of chances and Robbins; intent was in dispute so admission proper.
Evid. Code § 352 prejudice balancing for uncharged misconduct	Probative value substantial to rebut defense of drug‑induced confusion/mistake; presentation and limiting instructions reduced prejudice	Evidence was inflammatory, risked propensity-based conviction, and was presented piecemeal and by multiple witnesses, increasing prejudice	Affirmed. Court did not abuse discretion under § 352; evidence not highly inflammatory and limited by instruction.
Due process challenge to admission of the 2009 burglary	Admission violated due process by inviting impermissible propensity inference and had no legitimate purpose	Evidence served legitimate purpose—to prove intent—and was properly limited	Affirmed. No due process violation because evidence was relevant to intent and not solely propensity.
Presentence custody credit for time subject to parole hold	Rocha entitled to additional 41 actual days and 6 conduct days attributable solely to burglary because only part of parole term related to absconding	Conceded by the People	Modified. Court directed addition of 41 actual days and 6 conduct days to credit.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Harris, 57 Cal.4th 804 (prior similar burglary admissible to show larcenous intent)
People v. Robbins, 45 Cal.3d 867 (doctrine of chances and use of uncharged misconduct to prove intent)
People v. Lopez, 198 Cal.App.4th 698 (uncharged misconduct admitted only if substantial probative value)
People v. Partida, 37 Cal.4th 428 (§ 352 error may in narrow circumstances raise due process claim)
People v. Mungia, 44 Cal.4th 1101 (§ 352 balancing reviewed for abuse of discretion)