People v. Robinson
2015 IL App (4th) 130815
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- Reginald J. Robinson was convicted (bench, stipulated evidence) of unlawful trafficking in cannabis and sentenced to 20 years in February 2008.
- The Fourth District affirmed on direct appeal on February 11, 2009; Robinson did not file for leave to the Illinois Supreme Court.
- Robinson filed a pro se postconviction petition in July 2010; counsel later filed an amended petition alleging delay was caused by appellate counsel’s failure to notify Robinson of the issuance of the direct-appeal decision.
- The State moved to dismiss the amended petition as untimely under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c); the trial court granted the motion and dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
- On appeal, the court addressed whether Robinson’s claimed excuse (unaware of appellate disposition) demonstrated that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence, but found Robinson’s briefing lacked necessary statutory analysis of section 122-1(c).
- The court declined to adopt Wallace’s judicially created “fourth method” for computing the deadline and concluded the record/briefing did not show an absence of culpable negligence; judgment affirmed and costs awarded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robinson’s postconviction petition was timely under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) | The petition was untimely; statute’s timing provisions apply and Robinson missed the deadline | Delay excused because appellate counsel failed to notify Robinson of the direct-appeal decision, so lateness was not due to his culpable negligence | Court treated petition as late (forfeited contrary position), found defendant’s explanation legally incoherent without statutory analysis and affirmed dismissal |
| Whether lack of notice from appellate counsel shows absence of culpable negligence | State: absence of notice does not, given statutory framework and defendant’s failure to analyze triggers/dates | Robinson: unawareness of appellate disposition prevented timely postconviction filing and excuses delay | Court: defendant failed to tie lack of notice to any trigger under §122-1(c); excuse insufficient |
| Proper interpretation of “certiorari petition” in §122-1(c) | State & court: means petition to U.S. Supreme Court for writ of certiorari | Robinson (implicitly) relied on alternative readings (per Wallace) to get a different deadline | Court (de novo): “certiorari petition” refers to a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, not Illinois Supreme Court leave-to-appeal petition; rejected Wallace’s expansion |
| Whether Wallace’s approach supplies a fourth timing method when direct appeal was filed but leave to the Illinois Supreme Court was not | State: Wallace’s approach could render petition untimely | Robinson: relied on Wallace to say he had no realistic notice or ability to forecast different rule | Court: refused to judicially create a fourth method beyond statute; declined to adopt Wallace’s reasoning here |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Wallace, 406 Ill. App. 3d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (interprets §122-1(c) and attempts deadline calculations)
- People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115 (Ill. 2007) (applicable statute of limitations is the version in effect when petition filed)
- Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (U.S. 1982) (federal comity and procedural posture regarding review by higher courts)