People v. Rigsby
405 Ill. App. 3d 916
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2010Background
- Keith Rigsby was convicted at trial of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a felony.
- He was sentenced as a Class X offender to seven years in prison and ordered to submit a DNA sample and pay a $200 DNA analysis fee.
- The DNA requirement and fee stem from 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3, which mandates DNA collection for felonies and creates a database.
- Rigsby had prior drug felony convictions (Nos. 04 CR 25513 and 05 CR 2936) that already required DNA submission and fees.
- Rigsby challenged the requirement to provide additional DNA samples and pay another fee on appeal, arguing the statute is silent on duplicative sampling and fees for successive convictions.
- The appellate court vacated the additional DNA sampling and fee requirement, affirming the conviction in all other respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does 5-4-3 require additional DNA samples and fees for successive qualifying convictions? | People contends multiple samples/fees are permitted/required by statute. | Rigsby argues statute is silent on duplicative sampling and fees; only one sample/fee is needed. | Statute permits only one DNA sample/fee per offender; vacate additional sampling/fee. |
| May the administrative code imply no need for repeated samples for priorly sampled offenders? | People relies on administrative guidance suggesting future samples are unnecessary. | Rigsby disputes reliance on code; it does not mandate a single-sample rule across multiple convictions. | No; the code language does not compel a single-sample interpretation to defeat the statute's purposes. |
| Is the payment of the DNA analysis fee a prerequisite to challenging the fee on appeal? | People asserts no such prerequisite; challenge may proceed without payment proof. | Rigsby contends the fee challenge can proceed independently of payment status. | Challenge to the fee is not barred by failure to show payment; void-order challenge permitted. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Burdine, 362 Ill.App.3d 19 (2005) (DNA database purpose for recidivist offenders)
- People v. Evangelista, 393 Ill.App.3d 395 (2009) (DNA sample and fee context; purpose of statute)
- People v. Bomar, 405 Ill.App.3d 139 (2010) (statutory ambiguity and sampling/fee discussion)
- People v. Marshall, 402 Ill.App.3d 1080 (2010) (one DNA sample per offender; potential loophole avoided)
- People v. Grayer, 403 Ill.App.3d 797 (2010) (rejects duplicative-sample reasoning; supports multiple samples)
- People v. Hubbard, 404 Ill.App.3d 100 (2010) (confirms statutory authority to require additional DNA samples)
- Willis, 402 Ill.App.3d 47 (2010) (discusses DNA fee assessment in context of prior cases)
- People v. Unander, 404 Ill.App.3d 884 (2010) (conditioned sampling/fee orders; affects analysis)