People v. Richardson
82 N.E.3d 516
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- In 2010 Richardson (then Pierre Robinson) pleaded guilty to a Class 4 AUUW felony and was placed on probation. The AUUW statute subsection later was held unconstitutional in People v. Aguilar.
- In August 2011 police stopped a green Ford Taurus that matched a recently reported stolen vehicle; Richardson was a front-seat passenger.
- Officer Akinbusuyi testified Richardson, after being asked to show his hands, reached toward the center console and appeared to stuff something into his waistband; the officer handcuffed, patted him down, and recovered a handgun.
- The trial court initially granted defendant’s motion to suppress but later reconsidered and denied suppression; Richardson elected a bench trial and was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) based on his 2010 AUUW conviction as the predicate felony.
- On appeal Richardson argued (1) his prior AUUW conviction—premised on the statute invalidated in Aguilar—could not serve as a predicate felony, (2) the indictment failed to state a cause of action for UUWF, and (3) the pat-down/search was unconstitutional. The appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a prior AUUW conviction (under statute invalidated in Aguilar) can serve as a predicate felony for UUWF | State: McFadden permits use of an unvacated AUUW conviction as predicate | Richardson: Aguilar rendered the AUUW conviction void, so it cannot support UUWF; indictment defective | Held: McFadden controls—an AUUW conviction may serve as predicate unless it has been vacated; here it was not vacated, so valid predicate |
| Whether the UUWF indictment failed to state a cause of action because the predicate AUUW conviction was void | State: Indictment valid because prior conviction stood until vacated | Richardson: Indictment defective because underlying statute unconstitutional makes prior conviction void ab initio | Held: Rejected—indictment sufficed where prior felony had not been vacated per McFadden |
| Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down under Terry | State: Totality of circumstances (matching stolen-car description + furtive movements after being told to show hands) gave reasonable suspicion defendant was armed/dangerous | Richardson: Movements insufficient; passenger status and uncertain stop reason undercut suspicion | Held: Pat-down justified—officer could reasonably infer defendant might be armed; furtive movement after command supported Terry stop search |
| Whether handcuffing/search converted the encounter into an arrest requiring probable cause | State: Handcuffing during a Terry stop can be reasonable based on circumstances; does not automatically convert to arrest | Richardson: Use of handcuffs and search incident to arrest lacked probable cause | Held: Handcuffing was reasonable here and did not convert the stop into an unlawful arrest; no probable-cause requirement for protective Terry search |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (Illinois Supreme Court decision invalidating a portion of the AUUW statute under the Second Amendment)
- People v. McFadden, 2016 IL 117424 (Illinois Supreme Court holding an unvacated AUUW conviction may serve as a predicate for UUWF)
- People v. Colyar, 2013 IL 111835 (framework for review of suppression rulings; deference to factual findings, de novo review of legal ruling)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishing that officers may stop and pat-down when reasonable suspicion a person is armed and dangerous)
- People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (describing tiers of police-citizen encounters and standards for stops/searches)