People v. Rices
226 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118
| Cal. | 2017Background
- In 2006 Jean Pierre Rices and Anthony Miller robbed a liquor store; Rices shot and killed two victims; Rices pleaded guilty to first‑degree murder with special circumstances and admitted firearm and prior‑conviction enhancements. The prosecutor sought death for Rices; Miller was not death‑eligible. Rices’s penalty trial (his jury) and Miller’s guilt trial were held simultaneously before separate juries. The penalty jury returned death and the trial court denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict.
- Videotape and forensic evidence showed the victims were forced to the floor and shot in the back of the head; Miller testified blaming Rices at trial but had earlier inconsistent statements to police. Rices’s jury heard much of Miller’s live testimony (but not some inculpatory statements used in Miller’s trial). A post‑arrest letter from Miller and prior statements were used to impeach Miller.
- The prosecution introduced Rices’s extensive history of violent adult and juvenile crimes and prison assaults as aggravation. The defense presented mitigation focused on Rices’s severely dysfunctional childhood, early gang involvement, and expert testimony about need for earlier mental‑health intervention.
- Pretrial and trial procedural disputes included challenges to counsel’s qualifications and alleged conflicts (appointment of Chambers and Wolfe; independent advisory counsel Levine), Marsden motion, request for change of venue, voir dire limits and juror challenges, discovery issues regarding a delayed “free talk” by Miller, and an ex parte bench‑bailiff communication about jury access to exhibits.
- The Supreme Court of California affirmed: it rejected claims that counsel was unqualified or conflicted, denied that venue or jury selection errors required reversal, found non‑prejudicial disclosure failures and harmless ex parte communication, and upheld admission and use of aggravating evidence and prosecution arguments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Rices) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appointment/qualification and conflict of appointed counsel | Chambers met court/ABA standards; no disqualifying conflict; Levine’s limited inquiry was sufficient | Chambers was not class‑six; Private Conflicts Counsel’s concerns and Levine’s prior representation created conflict; Marsden should have been granted | Court found Chambers qualified under rule 4.117/ABA; defendant waived additional counsel; Marsden denial not an abuse of discretion; no prejudice from any alleged conflict |
| Counsel conflict as potential witness re: defendant’s "voices" | No actual conflict; mental‑health issues could be presented via experts or deputies; strategic choices are permissible | Chambers became potential witness and thus had to withdraw; disclosure to jail staff violated privilege and created conflict | No actual conflict shown; counsel not required to withdraw; trial court inquiry adequate; no prejudice shown |
| Change of venue for pretrial publicity and community bias | County can seat an impartial jury; publicity not so inflammatory; voir dire adequate | Extensive local publicity and strong community reaction (Chaldean community) made fair trial unlikely | Denial proper: publicity diminished by lapse of years, survey did not show presumptive prejudice, voir dire revealed impartial jurors |
| Failure to timely disclose Miller’s “free talk” statements | Free talk was not exculpatory; disclosure could be deferred for safety under Penal Code section 1054.7; prejudice unlikely | Prosecutor or court should have disclosed free talk to Rices before Miller testified; nondisclosure violated due process and right to confrontation | Any nondisclosure harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: free talk added nothing exculpatory and trial record allowed effective impeachment; no reversible Brady error |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Michaels, 28 Cal.4th 486 (discussed advisory/lead counsel role in capital case)
- People v. Doolin, 45 Cal.4th 390 (standards for conflicts of interest and presumed prejudice)
- Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (conflict‑of‑interest ineffective assistance standard)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance prejudice standard)
- Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (trial court duty to inquire into potential conflicts)
- Dunkle, 36 Cal.4th 861 (counsel as potential witness; callback to mental‑health testimony at penalty phase)
- Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (prejudice from pretrial publicity not presumed absent extreme circumstances)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (confrontation clause and admission of testimonial statements)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
- Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (defendant’s right to be present and right to counsel for communications with jury; harmless‑error standard)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (standard for excusing jurors for views on capital punishment)