People v. Reyes
14 Cal.5th 981
| Cal. | 2023Background
- In 2004, 15‑year‑old Andres Quinonez Reyes rode with other F‑Troop gang members to rival gang territory; a companion (allegedly Francisco Lopez) shot and killed driver Pedro Rosario. Reyes was not the shooter.
- Reyes was later found in possession of the murder weapon and used it in a separate assault the same day. He told police he would be charged because he "was there with my homies."
- At trial the prosecutor relied on (1) natural‑and‑probable‑consequences aider/abettor liability for murder and (2) direct aiding and abetting (backup) liability; Reyes was convicted of second‑degree murder and sentenced to 40 years to life.
- After Senate Bill No. 1437 eliminated natural‑and‑probable‑consequences murder liability, Reyes petitioned under former §1170.95 (now §1172.6) for resentencing. The trial court denied the petition, finding Reyes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of implied‑malice second‑degree murder; the Court of Appeal affirmed.
- The California Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding the trial court erred both as to (1) sustaining implied‑malice liability on a direct‑perpetrator theory (insufficient proximate causation and insufficiently dangerous act) and (2) applying incorrect legal standards for direct aiding and abetting implied‑malice murder.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Reyes could be denied §1172.6 relief because he was a direct perpetrator of implied‑malice murder | Reyes’s conduct (riding into rival territory, chasing the car) proximately caused the death and satisfied implied malice | Reyes was not the shooter; his acts were too attenuated to be a proximate cause or to carry a high degree probability of death | Rejected — no substantial evidence Reyes committed an act that proximately caused Rosario’s death; direct‑perpetrator implied malice not supported |
| Whether direct aiding and abetting can sustain an implied‑malice murder conviction and whether the trial court correctly applied that theory | Aider‑and‑abettor liability applies; Reyes acted as “backup” (presence, companionship, flight, later weapon possession) supporting knowing, conscious‑disregard culpability | If used, the aiding/abetting theory requires proof the aider intended to aid the perpetrator’s life‑endangering act, knew it was dangerous, and acted with conscious disregard; evidence insufficient | Court: Aiding/abetting implied‑malice is a valid theory, but the trial court misapplied the elements (failed to focus on aider’s mens rea regarding the direct perpetrator’s life‑endangering act); reversible error and remand required |
| Whether traveling with an armed gang member into rival territory alone satisfies the objective element of implied malice (high probability of death) | That conduct was inherently life‑dangerous and demonstrated conscious disregard for life | The conduct alone does not establish a high degree of probability of death; it is too speculative/attenuated | Court: The act (traveling and chasing) did not, by itself, show the high probability of death required for implied malice |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Gentile, 10 Cal.5th 830 (2020) (SB 1437 removed natural‑and‑probable‑consequences liability for second‑degree murder)
- People v. Knoller, 41 Cal.4th 139 (2007) (definition and elements of implied malice)
- People v. Jennings, 50 Cal.4th 616 (2010) (proximate‑cause requires defendant’s act be a substantial factor)
- People v. Cervantes, 26 Cal.4th 860 (2001) (causation in homicide: chain of events and necessity of causally significant act)
- People v. Cravens, 53 Cal.4th 500 (2012) (objective component of implied malice requires a high degree of probability of death)
- People v. McCoy, 25 Cal.4th 1111 (2001) (aiding and abetting rests on combined actus reus of participants and aider’s mens rea)
- People v. Powell, 63 Cal.App.5th 689 (2021) (articulates required elements for aiding and abetting implied‑malice murder)