People v. Relwani, 2019 IL 123385

Defendant Daksh N. Relwani was found alone in a running car in a Walgreens parking lot in Joliet at ~3:30 a.m., arrested for DUI, and his license was summarily suspended under Illinois’ implied consent statute.
He petitioned to rescind the summary suspension, arguing he was not on a “public highway” because the arrest occurred in a privately owned Walgreens parking lot.
At the rescission hearing defendant was the only witness; his testimony only identified the location (Walgreens parking lot at 1801 Ingalls Ave.) and that he was in the car; he frequently said “I don’t remember” on cross-examination.
At the close of the defendant’s case the State moved for a directed finding; the trial court granted it, concluding defendant had not made a prima facie showing that the lot was not a “public highway.”
The appellate court affirmed; this Court granted leave and held defendant was required to present affirmative evidence tending to show the lot was not publicly maintained or not open for public vehicular use, and that his minimal testimony failed to meet that burden.

Issue	People’s Argument	Relwani’s Argument	Held
Whether a defendant seeking rescission must present affirmative evidence to make a prima facie showing that the location of arrest was not a “public highway” under the Vehicle Code	The defendant bears the initial burden to present a prima facie case; absent that showing the court may grant a directed finding for the State	Relwani argued his testimony that he was in a Walgreens parking lot sufficed to infer the lot was private and thus not a “public highway,” and that the State should bear the burden of proving public maintenance	Held: Yes. Defendant must present some affirmative evidence tending to show the lot was not publicly maintained or not open to public vehicular use; his limited testimony was insufficient, so the directed finding was affirmed
Whether Relwani’s testimony (identifying the Walgreens lot and address) sufficed to shift the burden to the State	The People argued the testimony did not supply affirmative facts regarding public maintenance or public use, so it failed to raise a factual dispute	Relwani argued the lot’s private association with Walgreens created the necessary inference of non-public status	Held: The testimony was too minimal to support a prima facie case; courts require affirmative evidence (e.g., signage, ownership/maintenance facts, officer testimony) to avoid a directed finding

People v. Orth, 124 Ill.2d 326 (Ill. 1988) (motorist seeking rescission bears initial burden to make prima facie showing)
People v. Helt, 384 Ill. App. 3d 285 (Ill. App. 2008) (parking lot can be a "highway" if publicly maintained and open to vehicular public)
People v. Culbertson, 258 Ill. App. 3d 294 (Ill. App. 1994) (analysis of parking-lot/public-highway status)
People v. Ayres, 228 Ill. App. 3d 277 (Ill. App. 1992) (defendant’s prima facie showing sustained where lot was undisputedly private)
People v. Kissel, 150 Ill. App. 3d 283 (Ill. App. 1986) (same)
People v. Montelongo, 152 Ill. App. 3d 518 (Ill. App. 1987) (officer testimony that lot was fenced/posted supported non-public status)
People v. Kozak, 130 Ill. App. 2d 334 (Ill. App. 1970) (evidence that lot was not maintained by governmental body supported non-highway finding)
People v. Deleon, 227 Ill.2d 322 (Ill. 2008) (manifest-weight standard for reviewing factual findings)
People v. Wear, 229 Ill.2d 545 (Ill. 2008) (explaining burden shift if defendant makes prima facie case)