People v. Relerford
56 N.E.3d 489
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- Walter Relerford was charged with two counts of stalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(1), (2)) and two counts of cyberstalking (720 ILCS 5/12-7.5(a)(1), (2)) based on repeated contacts (calls, e-mails), uninvited presence at a workplace, and Facebook posts concerning station employee Sonya Blakey.
- At a bench trial the court found Relerford guilty and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and one year of mandatory supervised release (MSR); the MSR term was later corrected to four years.
- The indictments alleged Relerford “knew or should have known” his conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer emotional distress.
- Relerford challenged the statutes as violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments (free speech and due process), arguing they criminalize protected speech and lack a mens rea requirement.
- The appellate panel found the relevant stalking and cyberstalking subsections criminalized conduct based on how a "reasonable person" would react rather than the defendant’s subjective intent, conflicting with due process after the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis.
- The court vacated Relerford’s convictions and sentence solely on constitutional grounds and did not reach his other arguments (e.g., right to proceed pro se).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the general stalking statute are constitutional under the Due Process Clause | State defended statutes as valid tools to punish threatening or harassing courses of conduct that cause fear or emotional distress | Relerford argued the statutes lack a mens rea for the threatening element and improperly impose liability based on a "reasonable person" standard, violating due process | Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are facially unconstitutional because they permit conviction based solely on how a reasonable person would view the conduct, without requiring defendant’s subjective intent |
| Whether subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the cyberstalking statute are constitutional | State argued cyberstalking provisions are subject-matter specific but parallel the general statute and are lawful | Relerford argued cyberstalking provisions suffer the same mens rea defect as the general statute | Cyberstalking subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) are facially unconstitutional for the same due process reason |
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review unsentenced convictions after vacating the sentenced conviction | State contended appellate jurisdiction may be lacking for convictions without sentence | Relerford asserted standing to mount facial constitutional challenges to statutes under which he was prosecuted and convicted | Court exercised jurisdiction because the sentenced conviction was vacated, allowing review of remaining convictions |
| Whether Elonis affects prior Illinois decisions upholding stalking statutes | State relied on earlier Illinois precedent (e.g., People v. Bailey) | Relerford argued Elonis requires reexamination because it rejects conviction standards based solely on a reasonable-person view of communications | Court held Elonis controls; prior Illinois cases that predate statutory changes or Elonis do not control the constitutional analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (Illinois Supreme Court) (prior Illinois decision upholding earlier version of stalking statute)
- Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. _ (U.S. Supreme Court) (due process requires consideration of defendant's mens rea for threatening communications)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (U.S. Supreme Court) (criminal statutes generally require awareness of wrongdoing)
- United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (U.S. Supreme Court) (distinguishing communicative act from wrongful threatening nature)
- Cochran v. United States, 157 U.S. 286 (U.S. Supreme Court) (discussing mens rea requirement for criminal liability)
- People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346 (Illinois Supreme Court) (appellate jurisdiction where sentenced conviction is vacated)
- People v. Flores, 128 Ill. 2d 66 (Illinois Supreme Court) (no final judgment in a criminal case until imposition of sentence)