2022 COA 116
Colo. Ct. App.2022Background
- In March 2019 Reginald Snelling, while intoxicated, was at a friend’s apartment where he acted inappropriately toward two female guests and was asked to leave.
- He left, returned, and attempted to force his way inside; a scuffle ensued, a guest (D.B.) was struck, and Rogers (the apartment owner) called 911.
- Police arrested Snelling; while being transported he spat in a patrol car. Prosecutors charged him with second-degree burglary, first-degree criminal trespass, second-degree criminal tampering, and harassment.
- At trial Snelling was acquitted of harassment but convicted of burglary, trespass, and tampering and sentenced to probation and jail. The jury asked whether extreme intoxication can prevent formation of intent; the court declined to clarify.
- On appeal Snelling challenged the court’s refusal to answer the jury on voluntary intoxication, certain evidentiary rulings (including a contested 911 excerpt and prosecutorial references), and argued his trespass conviction should merge with burglary.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court erred in refusing to answer jury question about voluntary intoxication and specific intent | People conceded the court erred but argued the error was harmless as jurors could still convict | Snelling argued the jury’s confusion required clarification and the failure likely contributed to convictions | Court: Error; reversible for burglary and tampering (specific intent crimes); harmless for trespass (not specific intent) |
| Admissibility of a one-second 911 audio phrase referencing a female and intoxication | People: any error was harmless given split verdict and overall evidence | Snelling: one-second excerpt violated in limine rulings and prejudiced jury by implying sexual conduct and racial tropes | Court: Even assuming jurors heard it, admission was harmless; split verdict supports lack of prejudice |
| Prosecutorial references allegedly invoking racial tropes and impropriety regarding J. and P. | People: references described conduct that made guests uncomfortable and were relevant to revocation of invitation | Snelling: references improperly played on stereotypes and prejudiced jury; cumulative misconduct | Court: Issue not preserved on the specific racial-trope theory; reviewed for plain error and rejected—no reversible error or misconduct shown |
| Whether first-degree criminal trespass merges into second-degree burglary | People conceded merger should apply; urged conformity with current merger test | Snelling: sought merger (and the People agreed) | Court: Under Reyna-Abarca/Rock/Gillis merger test trespass is a lesser-included offense of burglary and should merge; affirmed trespass conviction but ordered burglary reversed (remand for retrial) — Judge Gomez would not reach merger issue |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Garcia, 940 P.2d 357 (Colo. 1997) (earlier precedent applying strict-elements test and concluding trespass did not merge into burglary)
- Reyna-Abarca v. People, 390 P.3d 816 (Colo. 2017) (reformulated the lesser-included-offense test to compare statutory elements)
- People v. Rock, 402 P.3d 472 (Colo. 2017) (held second-degree criminal trespass is a lesser-included offense of second-degree burglary)
- Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1993) (earlier strict elements merger test relied on in Garcia)
- Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo. 1986) (trial court must clarify jury confusion on central legal issues)
- Brown v. People, 239 P.3d 764 (Colo. 2010) (where evidence supports an intoxication defense, instruction is appropriate)
- People v. Gillis, 471 P.3d 1197 (Colo. App. 2020) (applies Reyna-Abarca and Rock to conclude first-degree trespass is lesser-included of first-degree burglary)