People v. Reese, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 706

Background

Defendant Keith Ryan Reese, an indigent pro se defendant, faced retrial after a jury deadlocked at his first trial on charges including criminal threats, felon in possession of a firearm, use of a firearm, and assault with a firearm.
Trial court ordered a "complete record," but the transcript provided before retrial omitted opening statements and closing arguments; it included only witness testimony.
Reese requested the missing portions and a continuance; the court denied the request and the continuance without the prosecution contesting the request at trial.
At retrial (about two months later) Reese again represented himself; the prosecution’s theory and key evidence (witness recantations and a missing firearm) remained substantially the same as at the first trial.
A divided Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, holding Hosner’s presumption applied only to witness testimony and requiring a showing of need for counsel statements; dissent said Hosner entitles indigent defendants to the full transcript.
The Supreme Court of California granted review to decide (1) whether Hosner’s presumption includes opening and closing statements, and (2) whether denial of those transcript portions requires automatic reversal or is subject to harmless-error review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Hosner’s presumption entitle indigent retrial defendants to the full prior-trial transcript including opening and closing statements?	Hosner/Britt do not require counsel statements; opening and closings are non-evidentiary and less critical than witness testimony.	Hosner presumes entitlement to a "full" and "complete" transcript; counsel statements are essential for anticipating prosecution theory.	Hosner’s presumption extends to counsel statements; defendant presumptively entitled to full prior-trial transcript including openings and closings.
Who bears the burden to justify withholding transcript portions?	Prosecution may require defendant to show particularized need for non-testimonial portions.	Under Hosner/Britt, prosecution must rebut the presumption and show alternatives suffice; defendant need not show particularized need.	Prosecution bears the burden to show a partial transcript or alternatives suffice; it did not here.
Is a partial denial of prior-trial transcript (only openings/closings withheld) a structural error requiring automatic reversal?	Hosner’s structural-error rule should be limited to total or near-total denial; partial denials are not automatically structural.	Denial of prior-trial transcript is structural per Hosner and requires reversal regardless of prejudice.	Partial denials are subject to Chapman harmless-error review; total or near-total denials remain structural.
Was the withholding of openings/closings prejudicial in this case?	The prosecution argues no prejudice: retrial theory was substantially the same, defendant represented himself, retrial occurred soon after.	Reese contends the missing transcript impaired preparation, cross-examination, and motion practice (continuance).	Error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (equal protection requires transcript access for indigent defendants on appeal)
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (indigent defendant facing retrial presumptively entitled to prior-trial transcript absent adequate alternatives)
People v. Hosner, 15 Cal.3d 60 (Cal. 1975) (indigent retrial defendant presumptively entitled to a full and complete transcript; denial was structural error)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless-error standard for federal constitutional errors)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (distinction between structural errors and trial errors; framework for harmless-error analysis)
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (closing arguments reveal parties’ overall versions of the case)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (discussion of structural error versus harmless error)