People v. Reese
2015 IL App (1st) 120654
Ill. App. Ct.2015Background
- Defendant Willis Reese, already serving a natural-life sentence for a 2007 murder conviction, escaped custody from Stroger Hospital on March 22, 2007, armed with a homemade shank; during the escape he stabbed or cut multiple people and boarded a hospital shuttle bus.
- On evidence including eyewitness testimony, the sheriff’s officer’s radio panic call, a shank recovered near the bus, and defendant’s own testimony admitting the escape attempt, a jury convicted Reese of aggravated vehicular hijacking, vehicular invasion, attempted armed robbery, and escape; acquitted him of disarming a peace officer and deadlocked on aggravated kidnapping.
- At voir dire Reese initially appeared shackled; the court deferred shackling decisions to DOC officers but ultimately ordered shackles removed for trial; one prospective juror saw leg shackles during selection and was questioned.
- Reese waived counsel pro se before trial after the court admonished him about potential sentences but did not explicitly state that any new sentence would run consecutively to his existing life sentence; the court later found his waiver substantially compliant with Rule 401(a).
- The State was allowed to impeach Reese with his recent murder conviction after he testified and to rebut his claimed “necessity” motive for escaping; the jury heard that Reese had been convicted three days earlier and faced severe exposure.
- The trial court imposed concurrent extended-term sentences (50, 30, 30, and 14 years) to run consecutive to his existing life sentence; on appeal the court reversed one conviction, affirmed others, and modified sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Reese) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for aggravated vehicular hijacking (did defendant "take" the bus?) | The statute applies to commandeering/forcing driver to drive; control over vehicle suffices. | No dispossession shown — victim retained possession/custody; mere control does not satisfy the statutory "take." | Reversed aggravated vehicular hijacking conviction: under Illinois precedent (Strickland/McCarter) the State must show dispossession (victim parted with possession/custody); forcing driver to drive was insufficient here. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for vehicular invasion (entered bus "by force") | Entry plus threats and subsequent violent struggle with driver satisfied "by force." | Entry through open door was not by force; any force occurred only after entry. | Affirmed vehicular invasion: force can be part of a connected series of events; struggle and immediate use/threat of force sustaining the entry element. |
| Variance between attempted armed robbery indictment (specified reaching for officer’s gun) and proof (jury could consider any property) | Indictment pleaded essential elements of attempt armed robbery; item named was surplusage. | Jury convicted on attempted taking of a different item (e.g., keys), creating a fatal variance. | No fatal variance: indictment set out essential elements; the specific item alleged was surplusage and defendant was not materially misled. |
| Shackling during jury selection (due process) | State: any error harmless—court later removed shackles; jurors questioned and prejudice limited. | Reese: court failed to conduct Boose analysis or articulate reasons for shackling during voir dire; shackles prejudiced self-representation and jury perception. | Trial court erred by failing to perform a Boose analysis, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming evidence and limited juror exposure. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 154 Ill. 2d 489 (Ill. 1992) (robbery "takes" requires victim to part with possession or custody)
- Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (U.S. 2005) (shackling error subject to Chapman harmless-error standard)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (prosecution must show constitutional error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
- People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305 (Ill. 1995) (force/threat in robbery context may be part of a single incident series)
- People v. Brooks, 202 Ill. App. 3d 164 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (robbery force need not occur at moment of taking if part of connected events)
- People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196 (Ill. 2013) (statutory-construction principles; de novo review on statutory interpretation)