People v. Reed
232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81
Cal.2018Background
- Defendant Ennis Reed was convicted (1999) of two counts of first-degree murder (Amarilis Vasquez and Paul Moreland), two counts of attempted murder, and found guilty of the multiple‑murder special circumstance; sentenced to death after a penalty‑phase retrial.
- The Vasquez murder: victim Amarilis Vasquez was shot in a Compton restaurant parking lot; her husband Carlos Mendez survived and identified Reed in a photo array, at a preliminary hearing, a live lineup, and at trial.
- The Moreland murder: Paul Moreland was shot and killed; witness Roy Fradiue (intoxicated) identified Reed from a photo array, a live lineup, and at trial; an SKS rifle found nearby fired casings matching two of three casings from the scene.
- Defense presented alibi/contradictory eyewitness testimony (Foster Slaughter, Joe Galindo) and mitigation evidence about Reed’s poor education and upbringing; Slaughter’s contemporaneous report was less exculpatory than his later testimony.
- Reed raised numerous appeals: Batson/Wheeler challenge to prosecution’s peremptory strikes of black venirepersons; denial of a continuance to locate witness Galindo; sufficiency-of-the-evidence and identification‑instruction issues; several penalty‑phase and constitutional challenges to California’s capital sentencing scheme.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Batson/Wheeler: prosecutor’s strikes of black jurors | Prosecutor’s pattern did not establish a prima facie case; post‑challenge record and juror questionnaires show race‑neutral reasons | Reed argued prosecutor used disproportionate peremptory strikes against black venirepersons, creating inference of discrimination | No Batson/Wheeler violation: court independently reviewed record under Johnson standard and concluded strikes were plausibly race‑neutral and not discriminatorily motivated |
| Denial of continuance to locate defense witness (Galindo) | State: continuance not warranted; defense hadn’t shown diligence or definite availability | Reed: denial deprived him of exculpatory testimony and violated due process and Sixth Amendment | No abuse of discretion: request indefinite in duration, limited proffered value, trial court properly denied continuance |
| Sufficiency—Vasquez murder & attempted murder of Mendez | Prosecution: Mendez’s live and photographic IDs and in‑court ID are sufficient | Reed: identifications unreliable/suggestive; single eyewitness insufficient | Evidence sufficient: Mendez’s consistent identifications provided reasonable basis for convictions; credibility/weight issues for jury |
| Sufficiency—Moreland murder & attempted murder of Fradiue | Prosecution: Fradiue’s identifications plus proximity evidence and recovery of SKS rifle support conviction | Reed: identifications unreliable (intoxication, lighting, delay), suggestive procedures | Evidence sufficient: Fradiue’s consistent IDs and circumstantial links (Reed near scene; gun recovered nearby) allowed reasonable juror verdict |
| Eyewitness‑identification jury instruction (CALJIC No. 2.92) omitted factors | State: modified instruction adequate; catchall covered omitted factors | Reed: trial court erred by omitting factors about prior contact and witness capacity | Court: omission of factors was error as to prior‑contact and capacity, but harmless because catchall language and defense argument covered issues and no reasonable probability of a different result |
| Penalty phase—lingering doubt & supplemental jury answer | State: standard instructions and counsel argument suffice; supplemental answer was an accurate legal statement | Reed: court should have given lingering doubt instruction, supplemental answer and other comments coerced jurors toward death | No reversible error: lingering‑doubt instruction not required, trial court’s supplemental answer accurate, and statements about guilt being conclusively presumed were proper for penalty phase context |
| Alleged coercion of juror after polling | State: court’s brief return to deliberations was benign and instructions precluded coercion | Reed: court’s actions coerced a holdout juror into agreeing | No error: prior jury instructions and court’s neutral direction to resume deliberations did not coerce verdict |
| Constitutional challenges to California death penalty scheme | State: statutes and procedures are constitutional and previously upheld | Reed: various Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment attacks (narrowing, arbitrariness, procedures) | Court reaffirmed prior precedents rejecting Reed’s challenges; no merit to reconsideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (U.S. 1986) (peremptory strikes may not be used discriminatorily)
- Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (U.S. 2005) (prima facie Batson showing requires evidence permitting an inference of discrimination)
- Wheeler v. People, 22 Cal.3d 258 (Cal. 1978) (California doctrine on discriminatory peremptory strikes)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- People v. Scott, 61 Cal.4th 363 (Cal. 2015) (Batson/Wheeler framework; relevant factors and review)
- People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 411 (Cal. 2016) (eyewitness identification factors and jury instruction context)
- People v. Ward, 36 Cal.4th 186 (Cal. 2005) (harmless‑error review for CALJIC instruction issues)
- People v. Gay, 42 Cal.4th 1195 (Cal. 2008) (lingering doubt evidence and penalty phase limits)
- People v. Brooks, 2 Cal.5th 674 (Cal. 2017) (review of jury question and trial court response on mitigation concepts)