People v. Reed, 2014 IL App (1st) 122610

Background

On Jan. 1, 2002, Reed and others assaulted Timothy Kollar in his home during a robbery; Kollar died of blunt-force and strangulation injuries. Reed was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder, armed robbery, and residential burglary; sentenced to natural life for murder.
On direct appeal this court affirmed the murder conviction and life sentence but reversed the robbery and burglary convictions for instructional/verdict-form errors under People v. Smith.
Reed filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging, inter alia, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel (claims about an oral statement, failure to suppress, Brady/identification issues, and appellate counsel omissions). He attached trial transcript excerpts and letters from appellate counsel.
The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act; Reed appealed.
On appeal Reed argued the petition stated the gist of ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims and that his natural-life sentence is void under later authority (People v. Bailey).
The appellate court held Reed forfeited the new appellate claims by failing to plead them in his postconviction petition; alternatively, the claims lacked merit and Bailey announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively on collateral review, so Reed’s sentence is not void.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Reed)	Held
Whether Reed’s postconviction petition stated the gist of ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims	The petition failed to raise the newly argued appellate-contentions, so they are forfeited	Reed contends his petition (and trial pleadings) sufficiently alleged appellate counsel omissions (failure to challenge Miranda, to press suppression, to challenge sentence under Smith/Bailey)	Forfeited: petition did not clearly set forth those appellate claims; summary dismissal affirmed
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to anticipate and argue Bailey-type relief (invalidity of life sentence)	Appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to anticipate a new rule decided after the direct appeal	Reed asserts counsel should have argued that his general guilty verdict made him ineligible for natural life under the reasoning later adopted in Bailey	Rejected: counsel need not predict a new legal rule; Bailey was a new rule decided after Reed’s direct appeal
Whether failure to attach affidavits/supporting materials required dismissal	State: statutory pleading/support requirement was not met	Reed: attached some transcript excerpts and letters; argued facts supported claims	Held for State: Reed failed to attach or explain absence of necessary affidavits/evidence for key factual claims, permitting summary dismissal
Whether Reed’s natural-life sentence is void under Bailey or other authority	State: Bailey announced a new procedural rule that is not retroactive on collateral review; sentence not void	Reed: Bailey undermines the sentence because separate verdict forms could have prevented an eligibility finding for life sentence	Held for State: Bailey is a new procedural constitutional rule that does not apply retroactively; sentence is not void

Key Cases Cited

People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2009) (trial court must provide separate verdict forms on request when different murder theories could change sentencing outcomes)
People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 2009) (standards for first-stage postconviction pleading — ‘gist’ requirement)
People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498 (Ill. 2004) (claims not raised in the postconviction petition cannot be raised for the first time on appeal)
Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (U.S. 1980) (due process concerns when removing lesser-included-offense options in capital cases)
Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (U.S. 1981) (double jeopardy principles when a sentencing-phase determination is inconsistent with an earlier jury verdict)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (new-rule analysis for retroactivity on collateral review)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (distinguishing substantive from procedural new rules for retroactivity)
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (example of a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review)