2018 COA 36
Colo. Ct. App.2018Background
- Robert K. Ray was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death; a Crim. P. 32.2 postconviction proceeding followed in which Ray alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
- Greta Lindecrantz was an investigator retained by Ray’s trial counsel; the prosecution subpoenaed her to testify in the postconviction hearing about the defense investigation.
- Lindecrantz, a devout Mennonite who opposes the death penalty on religious grounds, moved to quash the subpoena and refused to answer questions the prosecutor posed on direct examination, arguing that testifying for the prosecution would violate her Free Exercise rights.
- The trial court denied the motion to quash, found Lindecrantz in direct contempt when she persisted in refusing to answer, and remanded her to custody until she agreed to testify; she appealed.
- The court of appeals expedited the appeal and affirmed, concluding the state’s interests in ascertaining truth and rendering justice override her asserted Free Exercise claim.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Lindecrantz’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| May a witness refuse to testify on Free Exercise grounds when subpoenaed by the prosecution in a capital postconviction proceeding? | The state may compel testimony; public interest in evidence and just adjudication is paramount. | Her sincerely held religious belief opposing the death penalty makes testifying for the prosecution morally impermissible. | No — witness must testify; Free Exercise claim yields to the state’s compelling interests. |
| What level of scrutiny governs the burden on religious exercise — rational basis or strict scrutiny? | Crim. P. 17 is a neutral law of general applicability, so rational basis suffices. | Strict scrutiny should apply because (a) capital cases are distinct, (b) she is being compelled to speak, and (c) Crim. P. 17(h) is not truly neutral. | Court assumed strict scrutiny for purposes of analysis but held the state met it; the subpoena survives either standard. |
| Is requiring the judge to question the witness (instead of prosecutor direct exam) a narrowly tailored alternative? | The People argued normal prosecution-directed direct examination is appropriate and necessary. | Lindecrantz proposed the court ask direct questions to avoid her being a tool of the prosecutor. | Rejected — court questioning risks judicial advocacy/bias and is not an acceptable alternative; witness cannot dictate examination terms. |
Key Cases Cited
- Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (framework for Free Exercise review of neutral laws of general applicability)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compelling-interest/strict-scrutiny Free Exercise precedent)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (strict scrutiny for burdens on religious exercise)
- United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) (public right to every person’s evidence)
- Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1988) (compelling state interest in obtaining evidence outweighs religious objections)
- Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985) (similar holding requiring testimony despite religious objections)
- Smilow v. United States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1972) (compelling testimony where necessary for truth-finding)
- In re Williams, 152 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. 1967) (clergyman required to testify in capital case despite religious objections)