People v. Ray
252 P.3d 1042
| Colo. | 2011Background
- Colorado Supreme Court considered whether post-conviction discovery of witnesses' addresses was properly denied given extraordinary safety threats.
- Robert Ray was sentenced to death for murdering a key prosecution witness and a related case involved murders of witnesses and bystanders.
- Prosecution had placed many witnesses in the witness protection program and sought to extend protective orders to post-conviction proceedings.
- Trial court lifted the protective order and ordered disclosure of 13 witnesses' addresses to post-conviction counsel, some in witness protection.
- Post-conviction counsel argued addresses were material to investigate trial counsel performance and ongoing impeachment or mitigating evidence.
- The court framed a balancing test: extraordinary/compelling threat to safety versus materiality of addresses to post-conviction proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the original proceeding proper forum? | Prosecution seeks relief from protective order via C.A.R. 21. | Not stated explicitly beyond case posture; focus on remedy via rule absolute. | Yes; original jurisdiction proper. |
| Did the trial court properly balance safety vs. materiality of addresses? | Threats were extraordinary and compelling, outweighing any materiality. | Counsel's need showed only minimal materiality and could be addressed by alternatives. | Abuse of discretion; balance favored safety, so no disclosure. |
| Does the post-conviction context invoke a personal-safety framework akin to trial/confrontation cases? | Framework from safety cases applies to post-conviction in death-penalty context. | Need not decide confrontation-right applicability; safety framework may still apply. | Framework applicable; safety outweighed materiality in this case. |
| Did the trial court correctly determine materiality of each witness's address? | Addresses material to re-interview witnesses for ineffective assistance and impeachment evidence. | Minimal materiality; post-conviction counsel can work through the prosecution. | Materiality insufficient to overcome threat; addresses not discloseable. |
Key Cases Cited
- People ex rel. Dunbar v. Dist. Court, 177 Colo. 429 (1972) (personal safety exception to disclosure in pre-trial context)
- People v. Thurman, 787 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1990) (balancing safety vs. estimation of materiality in disclosure decisions)
- People v. Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 22 (Colo.1997) (personal safety framework; balance against materiality of addresses)
- People v. Rodriguez, 786 P.2d 1079 (Colo.1989) (compulsory disclosure principles and materiality of evidence)
- District Court, 933 P.2d 22 (Colo.1997) (extension of safety framework to witness addresses in post-conviction context)