520 P.3d 617
Cal.2022Background
- Defendant Marcos Antonio Ramirez was charged with first-degree residential burglary; jury was selected and sworn on July 5, 2017 and ordered to return July 6.
- On the morning of July 6 police and EMS responded to Ramirez’s home for a reported heroin/meth overdose; officers and EMS said Ramirez initially refused transport/treatment and told an officer he would come to court.
- After the judge instructed Ramirez (via officers) to be in court within 15 minutes, Ramirez told counsel he preferred to go to the hospital; he did not appear that morning and the trial court held an on-the-record colloquy with counsel and an officer.
- The trial court found Ramirez voluntarily absent under Penal Code §1043(b)(2), denied defense requests for a continuance or mistrial, proceeded with the one-day presentation of evidence in his absence, and the jury convicted Ramirez of attempted first-degree burglary; Ramirez returned and was present the next day.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court affirmed the voluntary-absence finding, holding that voluntary drug use is not per se a voluntary absence but that substantial evidence (viewed under an assumed clear-and-convincing standard) supported the trial court’s conclusion; dissents would have reversed for erroneous in absentia proceeding and prejudice from denial of a short continuance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly found Ramirez "voluntarily absent" under Pen. Code §1043(b)(2) without an evidentiary hearing | The totality of facts (voluntary drug ingestion, initial refusal of treatment, lucid demeanor, decision to go to hospital only after being told to appear) established voluntariness and justified proceeding | Absence resulted from an overdose/drug effect; voluntariness not established without a hearing; drug use is not per se a waiver of the right to be present | Affirmed. Court held drug use is not per se voluntary absence but substantial evidence (even under an assumed clear-and-convincing test) supported the trial court’s finding that Ramirez was aware of proceedings and had no sound reason to stay away |
| Whether the court abused its discretion by denying a short continuance and trying Ramirez in absentia | The public interest, presence of jury/witnesses and prosecution scheduling supported proceeding | A one-day continuance was reasonable; denial deprived Ramirez of the right to be present and was prejudicial | Majority declined to address (forfeiture); dissent would reverse for abuse of discretion and prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (U.S. 1912) (historic rule that if a noncapital defendant voluntarily absents after trial begins, the absence operates as a waiver allowing the trial to proceed)
- Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (U.S. 1973) (three-part test: absence is voluntary only if defendant was aware of proceedings, knew right/obligation to be present, and had no sound reason for staying away; voluntariness must be "clearly established")
- People v. Espinoza, 1 Cal.5th 61 (Cal. 2016) (adopts Taylor framework for §1043(b)(2) voluntary-absence analysis)
- People v. Concepcion, 45 Cal.4th 77 (Cal. 2008) (reiterating Taylor factors and limits on proceeding in absentia)
- People v. Gutierrez, 29 Cal.4th 1196 (Cal. 2003) (discusses trial court’s evaluation of voluntariness under totality of facts)
- Conservatorship of O.B., 9 Cal.5th 989 (Cal. 2020) (articulates appellate review when a trial finding is made by clear and convincing evidence: whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable the fact was true)
