People v. R.H. (In Re R.H.)
99 N.E.3d 29
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- R.H., a 16-year-old adjudicated delinquent for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and cannabis offenses, admitted gang membership and posted social-media content showing guns, gang signs, and drug use.
- Trial court placed R.H. on two years’ probation and ordered he have no contact with "any gangs, guns, or drugs" and to delete all "references to gangs, guns, or drugs" from his social-media accounts.
- R.H. challenged only the social-media restriction as an unconstitutional content-based speech restriction; he did not challenge the no-contact condition.
- The majority held the restriction is content-based but survives strict scrutiny because the State (acting parens patriae) has a compelling interest in rehabilitating juvenile probationers and the order is narrowly tailored to R.H.’s conduct and risks.
- The court distinguished Packingham and Omar F., finding the order limited to three categories closely tied to R.H.’s offenses and conduct and therefore practical and enforceable.
- The dissent (Presiding Justice Neville) argued the order is unconstitutionally vague and violates due process because it fails to define "gang" or specify what counts as a "reference," and urged a knowledge requirement for violations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the social-media ban is a content-based restriction requiring strict scrutiny | R.H.: the order targets topics (gangs, guns, drugs) and is therefore content-based and not narrowly tailored | State: content-based but juvenile probationers have reduced rights; restriction narrowly furthers rehabilitation and safety | Court: it is content-based and reviewed under strict scrutiny, but it survives because the State has a compelling interest and the order is narrowly tailored |
| Whether the State has a compelling interest to restrict speech of a juvenile probationer | R.H.: First Amendment protects speech; State interest not compelling here | State: parens patriae and Juvenile Court Act give compelling interest in protecting and rehabilitating juveniles and preventing violence/reoffending | Court: compelling interest exists given R.H.’s history, posts, and public-safety risks |
| Whether the restriction is narrowly tailored and reasonable/enforceable | R.H.: overbroad/vague; could sweep in protected speech and lacks specificity | State: restriction limited to three topics tied to offenses, practical to enforce, consistent with probation goals | Court: narrowly tailored to rehabilitative goals; practical and necessary to include online activity |
| Whether any error is plain and requires reversal; relevance of Omar F. decision | R.H.: even if error, it is serious plain error; Omar F. struck similar restriction | State: no constitutional error; if any, not serious plain error | Court: not plain error; Omar F. is distinguishable and its concerns about no-contact orders do not control here |
| Dissent’s vagueness/due-process claim | R.H. (via dissent): order fails to define "gang" or what constitutes a "reference," risks arbitrary enforcement; recommends listing symbols/gangs and a knowledge element | Majority: impractical to specify symbols/gangs; juvenile process requires flexibility; knowledge element not required under Illinois probation law | Held (majority): due-process vagueness rejected; dissent would have required clearer, narrower wording and mens rea |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (defines content-based speech restrictions and mandates strict scrutiny)
- United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (strict scrutiny requires narrow tailoring to compelling interests)
- Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98 (2017) (struck a broad ban on sex offenders’ access to social networking as overbroad under the First Amendment)
- Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (recognizes different constitutional standards for minors)
- Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (schools may regulate student speech that materially interferes with educational mission)
- People v. Allegri, 109 Ill. 2d 309 (1985) (probation violation need not be criminally culpable; probation is a privilege)
- In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (2003) (probation conditions implicating constitutional rights must reasonably relate to rehabilitation)