People v. Q.R.
7 Cal. App. 5th 1231
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Minor (Q.R.) and Jane Doe, both under 18, exchanged nude photos and videos; minor recorded sexual encounters and threatened to disclose them to coerce money and sex.
- Doe reported blackmail; police obtained a warrant to search Q.R.’s phone and found password-protected media and extortionate text messages.
- Q.R. admitted felony possession of child pornography (Pen. Code § 311.11(a)) and extortion (Pen. Code §§ 518, 520); forcible rape charge was found not true.
- Juvenile court declared Q.R. a ward and imposed probation.
- Probation condition required Q.R. to submit all electronic devices for warrantless search at any time and provide passwords to access messages, voicemail, photos, email, and social media. Q.R. challenged the condition as unconstitutionally overbroad.
- Court of Appeal affirmed the probation condition as properly tailored given the direct nexus between Q.R.’s offenses and use of electronic devices.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Q.R.’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless-search probation condition for “all electronic devices” is overbroad | Condition is necessary to prevent further electronic-facilitated crimes and to find hidden/passworded contraband | Vague and overbroad; could cover innocuous devices and third-party data or remote/cloud-stored information | Not overbroad as applied: direct nexus to offenses justifies broad device access |
| Whether undefined scope of “electronic devices” renders condition unconstitutionally vague | Broad scope prevents circumvention via unlisted devices | Could permit searches of unrelated consumer electronics | Held permissible to ensure probation monitoring and prevent circumvention |
| Whether condition improperly intrudes on third-party privacy | Probationer can notify contacts that information isn’t private; Q.R. lacks standing to assert third-party rights | Condition allows access to information posted by third parties that may be private | Court rejected standing-based challenge; speculative third-party harm insufficient to invalidate condition |
| Whether condition improperly allows access to remotely stored/cloud data and exceeds diminished juvenile privacy expectations | Restricting to local device data would allow circumvention; juvenile rights are more circumscribed while a ward | Remote access and broad content searches invade privacy beyond acceptable limits (argues Riley and analogous cases) | Held permissible: direct link to electronic use in crimes and diminished juvenile privacy make robust access appropriate; Riley distinguishable |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th 875 (juvenile courts broad discretion to impose reasonable probation conditions)
- In re Jaime P., 40 Cal.4th 128 (juvenile expectation of privacy significantly diminished while a ward)
- In re Antonio R., 78 Cal.App.4th 937 (juveniles subject to greater supervision; constitutional rights more circumscribed)
- In re Malik J., 240 Cal.App.4th 896 (electronic-device search condition found overbroad where no direct nexus to crime)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (warrantless cell-phone searches incident to arrest generally prohibited; distinguished here)
- Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (standing limits to assert Fourth Amendment rights of third parties)
- People v. Appleton, 245 Cal.App.4th 717 (2016) (electronic search condition struck where no relation between devices and crime)
- In re P.O., 246 Cal.App.4th 288 (2016) (modifying electronic search condition where it bore no relation to the offense)