People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613

In 1996 Price was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated arson; jury returned a general verdict after the trial court denied his request for separate verdict forms. He received natural life for murder and 30 years consecutive for arson.
Price pursued collateral relief multiple times (Post-Conviction Act petitions in 2000 and 2003; a 2010 §2‑1401 petition) without success. He did not previously challenge the court’s denial of separate verdict forms on direct or collateral review.
In February 2012 Price filed a pro se §2‑1401 petition claiming his natural life sentence was void because, under People v. Smith and People v. Bailey, the trial court should have given separate verdict forms; he sought to have the general verdict treated as felony murder and to be resentenced.
The trial court dismissed Price’s petition as untimely, ruling Smith did not apply retroactively and the judgment was not void; the appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding the petition was not time‑barred because a void judgment can be attacked anytime and that Smith applied retroactively.
This Court granted leave, then after issuing People v. Castleberry (abolishing the “void sentence rule”) directed supplemental briefing on Castleberry’s retroactivity and its impact; the Court held Castleberry applies to cases pending when announced and that Price’s §2‑1401 petition was untimely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Application of Castleberry to pending collateral matters	N/A (Castleberry issued after Price’s briefs)	Castleberry should not save the petition; if applied it bars Price’s void‑sentence argument	Castleberry applies to cases pending when announced and governs Price’s petition
Timeliness of §2‑1401 petition (two‑year limit)	Price: petition excused from time bar because he attacks a void judgment	State: petition is untimely; Castleberry eliminated void‑sentence doctrine so voidness exception does not apply	Petition untimely; dismissal affirmed
Whether Smith/Bailey error creates a "void" judgment excusing the time bar	Price: denial of separate verdict forms rendered judgment void under Smith/Bailey	State: Smith/Bailey announced procedural rule; it does not create a type of voidness that survives Castleberry or excuse the §2‑1401 time bar	Smith/Bailey error is not a recognized voidness ground post‑Castleberry; it does not exempt petition from time limits
Recharacterization of pleading (§2‑1401 vs successive postconviction petition)	Price: if vehicle wrong, court should recharacterize to avoid harsh forfeiture	State: recharacterization cannot bypass successive‑petition cause‑and‑prejudice requirements	Court declines recharacterization; petitioner must meet appropriate procedural tests in proper vehicle

People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916 (abolished the void‑sentence rule; statutorily nonconforming sentences are voidable, not void)
People v. Smith, 233 Ill. 2d 1 (trial courts must give separate verdict forms when specific jury findings affect sentencing outcomes)
People v. Bailey, 2013 IL 113690 (reaffirmed Smith and the remedy of treating a general verdict as felony murder when special verdict forms are required)
People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (articulated the void sentence rule that Castleberry later overruled)
People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151 (explains limited categories of void judgments after Castleberry)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (framework for retroactivity of new rules to cases on collateral review)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (distinguishes substantive vs. procedural rules for retroactivity analysis)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (states that new substantive rules must be given retroactive effect on collateral review)