People v. Pinkett, 2023 IL 127223

In June 2017 three motorcycles were pursued by a deputy; defendant (Pinkett) was charged with aggravated fleeing/attempting to elude and related traffic offenses after events that ended with his detention and arrest at a Walmart.
Deputies (some in plain clothes/uniform) located defendant in the Walmart bathroom; Sergeant Frazier grabbed a knife from defendant, ordered him to "not make a scene," and escorted him to the store front where he was handcuffed.
In opening statement the State told the jury that defendant never asked why he was being detained; defense objected and moved for a mistrial on grounds this improperly commented on defendant’s silence.
The trial court denied the mistrial motion (citing People v. Givens), the jury convicted Pinkett of aggravated fleeing and speeding, and he was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
The appellate court reversed, holding that under Illinois evidentiary law postarrest silence (pre- or post-Miranda) is neither material nor relevant to guilt and that the State’s comments were improper and not harmless.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: the State’s opening comment about Pinkett’s postarrest silence was improper, the trial court should have granted a mistrial, and the error was not harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility/Use of postarrest, postarrest pre-Miranda silence in prosecution opening	State: comment was permissible; silence was probative of consciousness of guilt and admissible under Rule 403 balancing; relied on Givens	Pinkett: Illinois evidentiary law treats postarrest silence as neither material nor relevant to guilt; such silence cannot be used to prove guilt	Held: Improper. Under Illinois law defendant’s postarrest silence (whether pre- or post-Miranda) is not material or relevant to guilt; State’s opening comment was prejudicial and a mistrial should have been granted
Harmless-error and impact on verdict	State: any error was harmless because evidence of guilt was overwhelming and defense mitigated prejudice through cross-exam/closing	Pinkett: evidence was not overwhelming; improper comment could reasonably have affected jury	Held: Error not harmless. Applying Doyle factors, comments (elicited by State in opening, repeated during trial) likely affected verdict and a new trial is required

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishes Miranda warnings and Fifth Amendment right to counsel/silence)
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (use of post-Miranda silence against defendant violates due process when silence results from Miranda assurances)
Rothe v. People, 358 Ill. 52 (1934) (Illinois rule that postarrest refusal to make a statement is neither material nor relevant)
Lewerenz v. People, 24 Ill. 2d 295 (1962) (postarrest refusal to speak is prejudicial and not relevant to guilt)
Sanchez v. People, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1084 (2009) (postarrest silence is neither material nor relevant to proving charged offense)
Givens v. People, 135 Ill. App. 3d 810 (1985) (case relied on below; treated postarrest pre-Miranda silence under constitutional analysis—distinguished by Illinois Supreme Court)
Aughinbaugh v. People, 36 Ill. 2d 320 (1967) (tacit-admission rule requires proof defendant knew he was being asked about the crime)
Dameron v. People, 196 Ill. 2d 156 (2001) (factors for assessing prejudicial impact and harmlessness when silence is referenced)
Patterson v. People, 192 Ill. 2d 93 (2000) (relevance measured by logical probability; threshold for admissibility)
Dabbs v. People, 239 Ill. 2d 277 (2010) (relevant-evidence threshold and exclusion when probative value is outweighed by prejudice)