People v. Pettis
2017 IL App (4th) 151006
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Kevin P. Pettis was arrested July 7, 2013, on firearm-related charges and remained in custody.
- The State moved to compel a DNA sample and, on September 9, 2013, obtained the trial court’s grant of a 120-day extension under 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) for DNA testing; the lab actually completed testing (and peer review) before the initial 120-day period ended.
- Multiple continuances, pretrial motions (including a Franks motion and suppression motion), and an interlocutory appeal followed; the appeal was resolved and mandate issued July 23, 2015.
- After additional scheduling activity, the State moved to continue in November 2015 (some continuances under section 114-4), and Pettis filed a third motion for discharge asserting a speedy-trial violation.
- The trial court granted Pettis’s discharge motion, holding that once DNA results were available the section 103-5(c) extension could no longer be relied upon and that certain later State continuances violated the speedy-trial period; the State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the section 103-5(c) DNA continuance grants the State a total of 240 days to try a defendant | The State: a court-granted 120-day continuance under 103-5(c) is cumulative with the initial 120 days, allowing up to 240 days | Pettis: once DNA results become available, the remaining portion of the 103-5(c) extension cannot be used; thus only 120 days should run from arrest | Court held the 103-5(c) grant gave the State up to 240 days; Johnson and Colson support that construction, so the State was entitled to 240 days |
| Whether the delays after July 2013 are attributable to the State or Pettis (impacting whether the 240-day window was exceeded) | The State: only 162 days are chargeable to the State, so it did not exceed the 240-day limit | Pettis: more days (249) should be attributable to the State, so his speedy-trial right was violated | Court allocated days (explained in opinion) and concluded 162 days were attributable to the State; because 162 < 240, the trial court erred in granting discharge |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Johnson, 323 Ill. App. 3d 284 (Ill. App. 2001) (section 103-5(c) continuance may yield a total 240-day speedy-trial period when the State requests and the court grants 120 additional days)
- People v. Colson, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1039 (Ill. App. 2003) (continued endorsement of Johnson’s approach to 103-5(c) extensions)
- People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (Ill. 1998) (trial-court discretion in allocating responsibility for delays; court scheduling may not be attributed to defendant)
- People v. Jones, 104 Ill. 2d 268 (Ill. 1984) (delay between filing of pretrial motions and court’s ruling is generally attributable to defendant)
- People v. Terry, 61 Ill. 2d 593 (Ill. 1975) (narrow exception where a defendant’s demand for trial signals abandonment of pretrial motions)
- People v. Ladd, 185 Ill. 2d 602 (Ill. 1999) (method for calculating speedy-trial period days)
- People v. Toolate, 62 Ill. App. 3d 895 (Ill. App. 1978) (certain continuances under section 114-4 do not toll or extend the statutory speedy-trial period)