People v. Pettis
2017 IL App (4th) 151006
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Kevin Pettis was arrested July 7, 2013, on multiple firearm-related charges and remained in custody; the State obtained a court order to collect his DNA.
- The State moved under 725 ILCS 5/103-5(c) for an extra 120 days (for DNA testing); the trial court granted repeated continuances after finding due diligence.
- DNA testing actually completed (peer review done) before the initial 120‑day speedy-trial period expired, but the court had already granted the full 120‑day §103‑5(c) extension.
- Procedural delays followed (defendant motions, interlocutory appeal, post-remand scheduling); parties disputed which periods were attributable to the State versus Pettis.
- Pettis filed a third motion for discharge (speedy-trial violation) after a short State continuance in November 2015; the trial court granted discharge, finding the State had exceeded the speedy-trial limit. The appellate court reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Pettis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the State violate Pettis's statutory speedy-trial right? | The State had 240 days (initial 120 days + 120‑day §103‑5(c) extension) so no violation given only 162 days attributable to the State. | Once DNA results became available, the extra §103‑5(c) time should no longer run; the State exceeded the 120‑day limit. | Reversed trial court: State entitled to 240 days; only 162 days attributable to State, so no statutory violation. |
| How should periods of delay be attributed between State and defendant? | Many continuances were State-requested and therefore chargeable to the State; interlocutory appeal and defendant motions were chargeable to Pettis. | Pettis argued several post-extension continuances were State-caused and should count against the State. | The court apportioned days: 162 days to State overall; periods tied to Pettis’s motions and the appeal were attributed to him. |
| Does a granted §103‑5(c) extension continue to run after DNA becomes available? | §103‑5(c) grants up to 120 additional days cumulative with the initial 120 days; once granted, the full extension is available regardless of when results arrive. | The remaining portion of the §103‑5(c) extension should be rescinded once the State actually obtains the DNA results. | Court declined to adopt Pettis’s view; upheld that a properly granted §103‑5(c) extension can yield a 240‑day total and need not be shortened when results arrive earlier. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kliner v. People, 185 Ill. 2d 81 (discusses deference to trial court on responsibility for delays)
- Ladd v. People, 185 Ill. 2d 602 (speedy‑trial day-counting rule: exclude first day, include last day)
- Johnson v. People, 323 Ill. App. 3d 284 (§103‑5(c) can produce cumulative 240‑day period when court grants 120‑day extension)
- Colson v. People, 339 Ill. App. 3d 1039 (examines due diligence under §103‑5(c) and permits case‑by‑case review)
- Terry v. People, 61 Ill. 2d 593 (exception where defendant’s demand for trial evidences abandonment of pending motions)
- Jones v. People, 104 Ill. 2d 268 (pending pretrial motions generally attribute delay to defendant)
- Toolate v. People, 62 Ill. App. 3d 895 (continuances under §114‑4 do not toll or extend the statutory speedy‑trial period)
- Garrett v. People, 104 Ill. App. 3d 178 (discussion relevant to construing a continuance as §103‑5(c) request)