People v. Peterson
106 N.E.3d 944
Ill.2018Background
- Drew Peterson, a former Bolingbrook police officer, was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2004 death of his third ex-wife, Kathleen Savio; sentenced to 38 years; conviction affirmed on appeal and appeal allowed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
- Kathleen died in 2004; death originally ruled accidental but later autopsies concluded homicide; Peterson’s divorce proceedings with Kathleen were unresolved and a hearing was imminent.
- In 2007 Peterson’s then-wife Stacy Cales disappeared; State alleges Peterson murdered Stacy to prevent her reporting or testifying about his involvement in Kathleen’s death.
- Before trial the State sought to admit hearsay statements of Kathleen and Stacy under Illinois’s common-law forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and former statute 115-10.6; a lengthy pretrial hearing produced findings the State met its burden under the statute (and later the rule).
- At trial several contested evidentiary rulings were made: admission of hearsay under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing, testimony from an attorney (Harry Smith) about Stacy’s statements, prior-bad-acts testimony (offer to pay $25,000), and a challenged media contract between defense counsel and a publicity firm.
- Issues raised on appeal included admissibility of hearsay under forfeiture, ineffective assistance for calling Smith, attorney-client and clergy-privilege claims, per se conflict of interest from counsel’s media contract, admission of other-acts evidence, and cumulative error.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Kathleen’s and Stacy’s hearsay under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing | Forfeiture doctrine (Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)) governs and State met preponderance burden to admit statements | Statute 115-10.6 (which required reliability findings) should control; alternatively State failed to prove intent to procure unavailability | Court held Rule 804(b)(5) (common-law forfeiture) controls over conflicting statute; trial court’s pretrial findings that State proved murder and intent by preponderance were not against manifest weight, so hearsay admissible |
| Requirement to identify specific testimony defendant sought to avoid | State not required to identify exact testimony; intent may be inferred from circumstances | Peterson argued State had to identify specific testimony to prove intent | Court held no such specificity requirement; intent may be inferred from conduct and circumstances |
| Ineffective assistance for calling attorney Harry Smith as defense witness | State: calling Smith was reasonable trial strategy to impeach Stacy/undermine Schori | Peterson: no sound strategy; calling Smith exposed damaging statements and violated privilege | Court held counsel’s choice was strategic and reasonable; Strickland prongs not met; claim denied |
| Attorney-client / clergy privilege blocking Smith and Schori testimony | State: no privilege because Smith declined representation; Schori’s communications were not confidential | Peterson: Smith’s and Schori’s statements were privileged and should be excluded | Court held no attorney-client privilege (representation never formed and post-refusal statements not privileged); clergy privilege inapplicable because conversation nonconfidential; testimony admissible |
| Per se conflict of interest from media contract between defense counsel and publicity firm | Peterson: contract created a per se conflict and violated Rules 1.7/1.8 requiring automatic reversal | State: Gacy does not establish per se rule here; discipline is ARDC matter; no factual showing of impaired representation | Court declined to expand per se conflict categories, found no per se conflict and Peterson forfeited argument of actual conflict; claim denied |
| Admission of prior bad acts (Pachter $25,000 offer) and Rule 404 notice | State: testimony intrinsic to course of conduct; constructive notice existed; provided timely motion in limine | Peterson: State failed to timely comply with Rule 404(c) and was unfairly surprised | Court held trial court did not abuse discretion in excusing late notice (good cause/constructive notice) and admitted testimony for intent; no reversible error |
Key Cases Cited
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (forfeiture-by-wrongdoing requires intent to procure witness unavailability; intent may be inferred from circumstances)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (forfeiture doctrine allows consideration of hearsay at preliminary admissibility hearings)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims)
- Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (early adoption of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing principle)
- People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246 (2007) (Illinois recognition of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and standard for hearings)
- People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74 (2010) (forfeiture doctrine: defendant forfeits right to challenge reliability by causing unavailability)
- People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117 (1988) (discusses potential conflict when counsel acquires publication rights; no automatic per se rule in that fact pattern)