People v. Perkins CA2/2
B269018
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 29, 2016Background
- In 1992 Perkins was convicted of receiving stolen property (a felony at the time).
- In 2009 he pleaded guilty to making criminal threats and admitted three prior prison-term felony convictions (including the 1992 conviction); the court imposed a 9-year term: 6 years for the substantive count and 1 year for each prior prison term enhancement.
- In 2015 Perkins successfully obtained redesignation of the 1992 conviction as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18).
- Perkins then moved to reduce his 2009 sentence by one year, arguing the prior-prison-term enhancement based on the 1992 felony no longer applies now that the conviction is a misdemeanor; the trial court denied relief.
- Perkins appealed and filed a habeas petition; the Court of Appeal considered both and affirmed the trial court’s denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Proposition 47 redesignation of a prior felony to a misdemeanor requires resentencing of an unrelated, already-imposed sentence that was enhanced by that prior felony | People: The enhancement remains valid because the redesignation does not operate retroactively to disturb final judgments or past enhancements | Perkins: Prop 47 makes the redesignated conviction a “misdemeanor for all purposes,” so the enhancement must be reduced; alternatively equal protection or lenity require relief | Court: No. Prop 47 is prospective for purposes of enhancements to final sentences; the prior conviction was a felony when the 2009 sentence was imposed, so the enhancement stands |
| Whether equal protection requires retroactive application of Prop 47 to remove enhancements based on prior convictions | People: Prospectivity is rationally related to legitimate penological interests; no equal protection violation | Perkins: Denying retroactivity creates two classes of similarly situated defendants (past vs. future) and is therefore unequal | Court: No. Prospectivity of ameliorative sentencing statutes is permissible and rational; equal protection is not violated |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Jones, 1 Cal.App.5th 221 (affirming nonretroactivity of Prop 47 for prior-enhancement relief)
- People v. Park, 56 Cal.4th 782 (2013) (section 17 “misdemeanor for all purposes” language is applied prospectively)
- People v. Tenner, 6 Cal.4th 559 (1993) (prior prison-term enhancement requires proof prior conviction was a felony when used)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) (presumption of retroactivity for ameliorative statutes applies only to nonfinal judgments)
- People v. Morales, 63 Cal.4th 399 (2016) (statutory purpose of saving money does not mandate readings maximizing savings)
- People v. Flores, 92 Cal.App.3d 461 (1979) (statutory destruction of records can show clear legislative intent to eliminate enhancement use)
- In re Chavez, 114 Cal.App.4th 989 (2004) (equal protection/retroactivity analysis where legislature intended retroactivity)
- People v. Floyd, 31 Cal.4th 179 (2003) (prospective-only application of ameliorative statutes does not violate equal protection)
