People v. Perkins
163 N.E.3d 148
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- Defendant Alvin Perkins was charged with first-degree murder after his ex-girlfriend, Teresa Iacovetti, was shot on June 26, 2007 and died days later; he was convicted and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling 70 years.
- Within hours of the shooting Teresa made three out-of-court identifications of Perkins to police (≈1:46 a.m.; ≈2:00 a.m.; later that day), and all three statements were admitted at trial.
- Trial court admitted the first two statements as excited utterances (and also referenced dying-declaration grounds) and admitted the later, more detailed statement under a forfeiture-by-wrongdoing theory.
- On direct appeal this court remanded for a preponderance-of-the-evidence hearing on whether Perkins killed Teresa with the intent to make her unavailable as a witness (i.e., the intent element required by Giles and Illinois Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5)).
- After a remand hearing the trial court found by a preponderance that Perkins intended to prevent Teresa from testifying (based on prior threats, order-of-protection context, prior criminal-damage incident and statements), and the appellate court affirmed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Perkins) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Denial of request to self-represent | Court properly refused because defendant’s request was not unequivocal and there were fitness/mental-capacity concerns; Rule 401 admonitions were not required while represented | Denial violated Faretta; he knowingly invoked right to proceed pro se | Denial affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion; defendant’s request was not a knowing, intelligent, unequivocal waiver given mental-health issues and procedural context |
| 2) Admissibility of Teresa’s statements under hearsay exceptions (dying declaration/excited utterance) | First two statements qualify as excited utterances (and trial court also referenced dying-declaration theory) | Statements were not spontaneous and dying-declaration requirements were not met | Excited-utterance rulings for first two statements upheld; dying-declaration admission was erroneous because no proof Teresa believed death was imminent |
| 3) Confrontation Clause (testimonial nature) | Statements were nontestimonial or, if testimonial, forfeiture-by-wrongdoing or dying-declaration exceptions apply | Statements were testimonial and defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine — confrontation violation | Statements were testimonial; dying-declaration exception did not apply; but forfeiture-by-wrongdoing extinguished Crawford-based confrontation objection and admission was permissible |
| 4) Forfeiture-by-wrongdoing intent requirement | The State proved by preponderance that Perkins killed Teresa to prevent her testifying (context: prior threats, order-of-protection, criminal-damage incident, "I know what I’m going to have to do when I get out") | Murder cannot have been intended to prevent testimony at the murder trial (no such trial existed); intent to prevent testimony of any anticipated proceeding is required and not shown | Court held intent to procure unavailability for testimony need not be limited to the particular prosecution later filed; remand finding that State proved intent by preponderance stands and supports admission under forfeiture-by-wrongdoing |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless declarant unavailable and prior cross-examination)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (distinguishes testimonial v. nontestimonial statements; ongoing emergency test)
- Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (forfeiture-by-wrongdoing requires intent to procure witness’s absence)
- Hanson, People v., 238 Ill. 2d 74 (Ill. Supreme Court: federal rule/coextensive common-law forfeiture doctrine)
- Sutton, People v., 233 Ill. 2d 89 (Victim statements in ambulance were testimonial under Davis/Crawford analysis)
- Stechly, People v., 225 Ill. 2d 246 (discussion of forfeiture-by-wrongdoing as hearsay exception and confrontation extinguishment)
