People v. Perez-Rodriguez
2017 COA 77
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Perez-Rodriguez lived with A.S.; they held themselves out as husband and wife and called A.S.’s children (including J.H-S.) father/daughter and stepchild relationships, though there was no formal marriage or adoption.
- In summer 2012, when J.H-S. was 15, Perez-Rodriguez forced her to have sexual intercourse on two occasions; she later gave birth and DNA confirmed he was the father.
- Police investigated after A.S. learned of the pregnancy; Perez-Rodriguez initially denied, then — after Miranda warnings and a ~40-minute interview with an interpreter — admitted intercourse.
- A jury convicted him of aggravated incest (two counts), sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as a pattern (two counts), and sexual assault with actor ≥10 years older (two counts).
- Trial court sentenced him to life with parole eligibility after 12 years. Perez-Rodriguez appealed raising: (1) as-applied vagueness of the aggravated-incest statute re: common-law stepchildren; (2) flawed aggravated-incest jury instruction on mens rea; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal about common-law marriage; and (4) involuntariness of his confession.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Aggravated-incest statute vagueness (as-applied to common-law stepchildren) | Statute gives fair notice; common-law marriage and “stepchild” are ascertainable via statute and case law; balancing factors are acceptable | Statute is vague because common-law marriage depends on multiple nonstatutory factors, so defendant could not know whether a victim qualified as his stepchild | Not vague as applied — common-law marriage standards (consent + open assumption; cohabitation and reputation plus listed factors) give sufficient notice |
| 2. Jury instruction mens rea scope for aggravated incest | Instruction properly stated elements and mens rea applied to elements | Instruction phrased could limit "knowingly" to sexual act only, not to knowing victim was stepchild | Reviewed for plain error; even if erroneous, any error was not plain because evidence defendant knew J.H-S. was his stepdaughter was overwhelming |
| 3. Prosecutorial misconduct re: common-law marriage in rebuttal | Rebuttal argument did not misstate law; viewed with instructions, no prejudice | Prosecutor implied a single factor alone (e.g., cohabitation) sufficed, contradicting precedent requiring consent plus assumption/reputation | No plain error — instruction correctly stated the law; prosecutor's comments in context did not undermine fairness |
| 4. Voluntariness of confession | Confession voluntary: Miranda warnings given, waiver signed, interrogation ~40 minutes, no specific promises/threats | Interrogator implied judges/prosecutors might be compassionate if defendant was truthful, amounting to implied promises of leniency that coerced confession | Admission upheld: statements were general suggestions, not concrete promises or threats; totality of circumstances shows voluntariness |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lucero, 747 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1987) (defines common-law marriage elements and evidentiary factors)
- Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513 (1994) (upholds statutes using objective criteria and scienter against vagueness challenge)
- State v. Munson, 714 S.W.2d 515 (Mo. 1986) (upholds statute despite reliance on nonexclusive factors)
- People v. Quintana, 601 P.2d 350 (Colo. 1979) (promises of leniency by authorities can render confession involuntary when concrete and causally linked)
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (confessions must be voluntary to be admissible)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Miranda warnings required for custodial interrogation)