People v. Perez CA5, F078217

Background

Abel Perez, a state prison inmate, was convicted by a jury of assault by a state prison inmate with force likely to cause great bodily injury; jury found he used a deadly weapon; sentence 26 years to life.
Correctional officers testified Perez and co-defendant Mario Martinez were attacking the victim; officers saw no weapons during the fight; later two inmate-made weapons were found; victim invoked Fifth; both Martinez and Perez denied using weapons.
During voir dire and again after the close of evidence, the trial judge repeatedly likened jurors’ factfinding (and the reasonable-doubt standard) to everyday decisionmaking and to examples involving pets, even offering a quantitative-sounding example ("80, 90 percent").
The court read the CALCRIM No. 220 reasonable-doubt instruction, but the judge’s post-evidence colloquy interwove the concept of determining ‘‘culpability’’ with ordinary-life judgments after that reading.
On appeal Perez argued those analogies impermissibly lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof; the People argued forfeiture, harmlessness, and that the comments were innocuous or made pretrial.
The Court of Appeal held the comments likely lowered the burden of proof, were not forfeited because they implicated due process, and reversed the conviction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Perez)	Held
Whether the judge's analogies and examples lowered the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard	Comments were innocuous, explanatory, not intended to substitute for formal instructions; some remarks were pre-sworn and unlikely heard by all jurors	Remarks equated criminal proof to ordinary-life decisions and gave quantitative impressions, thereby reducing the prosecution's burden	Reversed: analogies likely led jurors to apply ordinary decision standards to reasonable doubt and thus lowered burden of proof
Whether Perez forfeited the claim by not objecting at trial	Failure to object forfeits instructional error	No forfeiture when error affects substantial rights and implicates constitutional due process	No forfeiture: claim reviewed because it challenges denial of due process (reasonable-doubt protection)
Whether correct reading of CALCRIM No. 220 and prosecutor's closing cured the judge's colloquy	Proper instructions were read and prosecutor reminded jurors the judge supplies the law; these cured any earlier remarks	Post-instruction, vivid analogies came after the correct definition and could overpower it; prosecutor’s remarks were insufficient to cure	Not cured: post-evidence, vivid examples likely left an indelible impression and could mislead jurors
Whether pretrial comments (voir dire) distinguishable from post-evidence comments for harmlessness	Pretrial comments are less likely to affect deliberations and may be harmless	Post-evidence reiteration made the analogy more prejudicial and likely influential	Distinguishable and prejudicial: post-evidence repetition made error more likely to affect verdict

Key Cases Cited

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (misdescription of burden of proof vitiates jury findings and compels reversal)
People v. Daveggio and Michaud, 4 Cal.5th 790 (2018) (instructions must not equate reasonable doubt to ordinary decision standards; timing of comments matters)
People v. Potts, 6 Cal.5th 1012 (2019) (brief pretrial analogy to ordinary decisions was not reversible error where proper instructions were also given and comments differed in context)
People v. Johnson, 119 Cal.App.4th 976 (2004) (tinkering with the statutory reasonable-doubt definition can lower the prosecution’s burden and warrant reversal)
People v. Katzenberger, 178 Cal.App.4th 1260 (2009) (suggesting a specific quantitative measure of reasonable doubt is inappropriate)
People v. Mitchell, 7 Cal.5th 561 (2019) (failure to object does not forfeit review when substantial rights are affected)
People v. Reese, 2 Cal.5th 660 (2017) (constitutional errors in burden of proof analysis require reversal)