People v. Perez
2018 IL App (1st) 153629
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- On Feb 18, 2012, 17‑year‑old Edgar Delgado was shot and killed; defendant Christopher Perez (then 17) was tried and convicted of intentional first‑degree murder and personally discharging a firearm.
- Key eyewitness: Bernardino Mercado followed the cars, saw Perez chase and fire at Delgado under a streetlight, identified Perez multiple times (photo array, grand jury, trial).
- Another witness, Hector Martinez (victim’s cousin), was knocked off his bike by a van, testified he did not see Perez on the corner and thus that Perez could not have been the shooter; Martinez had prior inconsistent statements.
- Forensics: Autopsy showed two gunshot wounds to the back; no close‑range firing evidence.
- Trial result and sentence: Jury convicted Perez; trial court imposed 53 years (45–natural minimum + mandatory 25‑year firearm enhancement).
- Appellate disposition: Conviction and 53‑year sentence affirmed; mittimus corrected to reflect merger of lesser included offense and to award 1,283 days’ presentence credit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict of intentional murder | Mercado’s positive, repeated identifications and corroborating testimony (Cabrera, Martinez’s prior statements) support conviction | Mercado was inconsistent, initially failed to identify Perez, photographic/forensic discrepancies make ID unreliable | Affirmed: viewing evidence in State’s favor, a rational jury could credit Mercado and convict; single credible eyewitness can support a conviction (Siguenza‑Brito) |
| Improper impeachment by State of its own witness (Martinez) | State may impeach a witness whose trial testimony gives affirmative damage to its case | Impeachment improper because Martinez never identified shooter at trial | Affirmed: Martinez’s trial testimony (that Perez could not have been the shooter) was affirmatively damaging to State; prior inconsistent statements properly admitted for impeachment |
| Eighth Amendment / proportionate penalties clause challenge to 53‑year sentence as de facto life for a juvenile | 53 years combined with life expectancy tables makes sentence effectively life; Miller requires consideration of youth for de facto life sentences | Sentence is survivable (release at ~70), not a de facto life term; Miller factors not required; sentence proportionate given seriousness and firearm enhancement | Affirmed: sentence not a de facto life sentence; Miller not triggered; sentence does not violate federal or state proportionate penalties clause |
| Mittimus corrections and presentence credit | N/A (State concedes errors) | Mittimus incorrectly lists both intentional and knowing murder and wrong presentence days | Remanded/corrected: lesser included offense must merge into intentional murder; mittimus corrected to 1,283 days’ presentence credit |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206 (discusses standard for sufficiency review)
- People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532 (appellate court will not retry factfinder; credibility for jury)
- People v. Siguenza‑Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 (single credible eyewitness can support conviction)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles requires consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller retroactivity and principle that hope of release matters)
- People v. Leon Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (proportionate penalties analysis; juvenile sentencing considerations)