People v. Perdomo CA2/8
B263533A
| Cal. Ct. App. | Oct 4, 2016Background
- On Aug. 23, 2012 Mario Castro (Tiny Winos clique of MS) was shot and killed outside his workplace; police recovered .38-caliber bullets from his body and surveillance showed a white SUV leave the scene.
- Edwin Castillo (owner/driver of the white SUV) and Ivan Castro (passenger; gang moniker "Innocente") were arrested shortly after; cell‑tower data, phone calls, and texts placed them near the scene and traveling together. Castillo’s SUV contained a loaded .38 revolver (not forensically matched) and Castillo’s fingerprints; investigators found .38 bullets, a revolver cylinder, a bandana, and gang-related items at Castro’s residence.
- Castro sent private texts after the killing saying (in translation) things like “we did some good work,” “we killed Dandy,” and “I got my vengeance.” A former Bagos member (Angel) and a police gang expert testified about gang rivalry, a prior 2011 shooting that left Castro paralyzed, and that Mario had been "green‑lighted."
- A jury convicted both defendants of first‑degree murder (willful, deliberate, premeditated), found gang and firearm enhancements true, and the court sentenced each to 50 years‑to‑life (25 to life for murder + 25 to life for a firearm enhancement). Appellants appealed; the court affirms convictions but orders limited sentencing corrections.
- The court addressed multiple evidentiary and instructional issues: sufficiency/form of verdict forms and personal premeditation, admissibility of uncharged gang‑related acts and firearms evidence, confrontation/hearsay issues under People v. Sanchez, accomplice‑statement and Declaration Against Interest issues for Castro’s texts, and whether a voluntary‑manslaughter instruction was required.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Verdict form & §1157 — Did verdicts satisfy requirement to find first‑degree murder? | People: Verdicts expressly found murders were "willful, deliberate, and premeditated," satisfying §1157. | Appellants: Forms did not specify first degree and used passive voice, so §1157 not met and personal premeditation not found. | Affirmed: Express finding of willful, deliberate, premeditated murder satisfies §1157; context/instructions show jury found each personally premeditated. |
| Jury instructions — Failure to state premeditation required specific intent / plurality language risk | People: Instructions, taken as a whole, defined murder and premeditation and required specific intent; plural usage did not permit convicting one defendant for both. | Appellants: Plural language and lack of explicit specific‑intent statement could mislead jury about personal premeditation. | Rejected: No reasonable likelihood of confusion; any omission harmless where substantive instructions defined required mental state. |
| Admission of prior gang acts / texts / firearms — relevance vs. undue prejudice | People: Prior acts, texts (AK‑47, recruitment), and firearms were probative of motive, active gang participation, opportunity, and the gang enhancement; limited‑use instructions were given. | Appellants: Evidence was unfair character/propensity evidence and unduly prejudicial. | Affirmed: Trial court did not abuse discretion; evidence was highly probative of motive, gang enhancement, premeditation, and not substantially more prejudicial. |
| Gang expert and informant hearsay / Confrontation Clause under Sanchez — permissible basis testimony? | People: Expert and former member testimony established background, feud, and green‑light; Angel’s green‑light testimony was non‑hearsay directive and expert basis testimony was admissible. | Appellants: Officer Salazar’s and Angel’s recounting of out‑of‑court statements were case‑specific hearsay and (per Sanchez) testimonial, violating state hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. | Mixed/Harmless: Angel’s testimony about the green‑light (a directive) admissible nonhearsay; some Angel testimony about the feud was hearsay but harmless. Officer Salazar’s case‑specific hearsay implicated Sanchez and Crawford but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given other corroborating evidence (texts, Angel, graffiti). |
| Admission of Castro’s private texts against Castillo (Bruton/Crawford/§1230) | People: Texts were nontestimonial and admissible as declarations against penal interest (trustworthy); did not implicate Bruton. | Castillo: Texts were statements by a nontestifying codefendant and their admission violated Confrontation/Bruton and required severance; also argued accomplice‑corroboration Instruction §1111 should apply. | Affirmed: Texts were nontestimonial (private messages to girlfriend) and admissible under Evidence Code §1230 as trustworthy declarations against interest; not "testimony" under §1111 so no accomplice‑corroboration instruction required. |
| Sua sponte manslaughter instruction (heat of passion) | Appellants: Long‑running provocation (prior shooting that paralyzed Castro) warranted voluntary manslaughter instruction. | People: Evidence showed deliberate revenge planning and no sudden quarrel or provocation by victim; no instruction required. | Affirmed: No substantial evidence of heat of passion; planning/deliberation and time lapse negate manslaughter claim. |
| Instruction on gang "primary activities" phrasing/errors | People: Instruction listed crimes and gang expert tied primary activities to qualifying crimes; any minor wording issues harmless. | Appellants: Instruction improperly listed nonqualifying items ("assault", "drug cases"), failed to define elements, and used "such as" allowing other crimes. | Partially agreed/Harmless: "Assault"/"drug cases" wording inaccurate, but record and expert testimony showed qualifying crimes (murder, armed assault, narcotics sales, extortion), so error harmless; no reversible prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Sanchez, 63 Cal.4th 665 (2016) (limits expert testimony relaying case‑specific out‑of‑court statements; such statements are hearsay and may implicate Confrontation Clause)
- People v. Nguyen, 61 Cal.4th 1015 (2015) (firearms and gang evidence admissible where connected to gang activity and not unduly prejudicial)
- People v. Rangel, 62 Cal.4th 1192 (2016) (standards for prosecutorial misconduct and testimonial analysis for statements)
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (2014) (aider/abettor liability and requirement that each perpetrator/aider personally premeditate for first‑degree premeditated murder)
- People v. San Nicolas, 34 Cal.4th 614 (2004) (verdict forms finding willful, deliberate, and premeditated conduct satisfy §1157)
- In re C.R., 168 Cal.App.4th 1387 (2008) (clarifying that express finding of premeditation satisfies §1157 for murder degree determination)