People v. Penunuri
233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324
| Cal. | 2018Background
- Defendant Richard Penunuri was convicted by a jury of three murders (Molina, Murillo, Castillo), conspiracy to murder Castillo, robbery, and assault; special circumstances (multiple murder, witness murder) and firearm-use enhancements were found true; jury returned death sentence; automatic appeal followed.
- Key factual thread: late-night group in a white Cadillac (Penunuri, Delaloza, Castillo and others) committed a Ralphs parking-lot robbery; hours later Penunuri threatened Luke Bissonnette and Carlos Arias with a gun on Hornell Street; shortly thereafter gunshots at Goodhue Street killed Molina and Murillo while they slept; neighbors saw two men flee to the Cadillac.
- Castillo was later murdered in the mountains; testimony (including jail calls and cooperating witness Marin) showed Penunuri urged silencing Castillo; several co-defendants were implicated and recorded statements and wiretaps were introduced.
- Prosecution introduced out-of-court testimonial statements by unavailable witnesses (Arias, Delaloza); defense objected citing Confrontation Clause; trial court admitted some such statements and excluded others; some evidentiary rulings and jury instructions were contested on appeal.
- The Supreme Court of California affirmed convictions and sentence, rejecting challenges to juror removal, sufficiency of evidence (guilt, conspiracy, aiding/abetting, special circumstance), and most trial and penalty-phase errors, while finding some Confrontation Clause admissions erroneous but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Removal of prospective juror S.M. for cause | State: juror equivocated about death penalty; trial court properly excused him under Wainwright/Witt standard and deference to demeanor | Penunuri: excusal violated due process and impartial jury rights because S.M. expressed doubts but not automatic disqualification | Court: excusal was proper; responses were equivocal and trial court did not abuse discretion |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Penunuri shot Molina and Murillo (and multiple-murder special circumstance) | State: eyewitness ID (Luke, others), Penunuri’s prior displaying of a gun, physical and circumstantial corroboration (casings, movements) support verdict | Penunuri: identification unreliable; Delaloza (alternate shooter) evidence undermines verdict | Court: viewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict, substantial evidence supports first-degree murder convictions and special circumstance |
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy and aiding/abetting Castillo murder | State: jail calls and witness overheard statements show agreement and intent to silence Castillo; overt acts by co-conspirators satisfy statutory overt-act requirement | Penunuri: calls reflect intimidation not intent to kill; insufficient direct proof tying him to conspiracy or murder | Court: circumstantial evidence and co-conspirators’ statements suffice to infer agreement and specific intent; conviction affirmed |
| Admission of Arias and Delaloza out-of-court statements (Confrontation Clause) | State: Arias’s spontaneous utterance to Luke admissible; other statements erroneous but harmless; Delaloza’s taped interrogation testimonial but cumulative | Penunuri: admission of testimonial statements violated Sixth Amendment and prejudiced guilt and penalty phases | Held: Arias’s in-person excited utterance to Luke admissible; Arias’s taped statement and prior testimony, and Delaloza’s police interrogation, were testimonial and admitted in error, but errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for guilt and penalty phases (majority) |
| Admission of gang expert testimony referencing Mexican Mafia and mistrial motion | State: testimony within scope of permitted gang-sign interpretation; any stray remark was brief and cured by instruction | Penunuri: reference unduly prejudicial and required mistrial; prosecutor misconduct | Court: trial court did not abuse discretion; struck offending remark and instructed jury to disregard; no prosecutorial misconduct shown |
| Penalty-phase trial errors: defendant absent for codefendant Castro’s closing; victim family opinions; admission of uncharged assault in aggravation; failure to define reasonable doubt at penalty | State: errors harmless beyond reasonable doubt; overall aggravation (murders, witness-killing) dominated; jury instructions and CALJIC framework adequate | Penunuri: absence violated statutory/presence rights; family witness opinions and unsupported uncharged offense prejudiced sentencing; reasonable-doubt omission was error | Court: failing to secure waiver before excluding defendant from Castro’s closing was error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; victim opinion testimony and admission of Uzel assault in aggravation were erroneous but harmless; omission of penalty-phase reasonable-doubt instruction was error but harmless given guilt-phase instruction and context; individualized sentencing requirement satisfied |
Key Cases Cited
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (opposition to death penalty does not automatically disqualify juror)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (juror removal for cause when views would substantially impair duties; deference to trial court)
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) (deference to trial court’s demeanor-based juror assessments)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay barred by Confrontation Clause absent prior cross-examination)
- Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (distinguishing testimonial from nontestimonial statements in emergency contexts)
- People v. Zamudio, 43 Cal.4th 327 (2008) (standard for sufficiency review; substantial evidence test)
- People v. Anderson, 43 Cal.3d 1104 (1987) (confrontation error harmlessness requires properly admitted evidence overwhelming and the extrajudicial statement merely cumulative)
- People v. Brown, 31 Cal.4th 518 (2003) (standards for excited utterance admissibility and timing)