People v. Pennington
221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 448
| Cal. | 2017Background
- Defendant Pennington entered a Santa Barbara marina without permission; harbor patrol officers responded and confronted him on a narrow dock.
- Officers Hubbard and Kelly, in uniform with badges and weapons, ordered Pennington to stop; he ignored them, assaulted Hubbard (kick) and Kelly (kick), and resisted, leading to arrest and later battery and related charges including misdemeanor battery on a peace officer (§ 243(b)).
- At pretrial the People asked the court to rule Santa Barbara Harbor Patrol officers were peace officers as a matter of law; the court granted the People’s motion and instructed the jury a sworn harbor patrol member is a peace officer.
- Trial testimony described harbor patrol duties (marine safety, towing, boating assistance, law enforcement duties within the marina) but the People did not elicit evidence that Officer Hubbard’s "primary duty" was enforcement of the law as required by Penal Code § 830.33(b).
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction declining to follow People v. Miller; the California Supreme Court granted review limited to whether the People proved the victim was a peace officer under § 243(b).
- The Supreme Court reversed the battery conviction, holding the People failed to prove Hubbard was a peace officer because they presented no evidence his primary duty was law enforcement under § 830.33(b).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a harbor/port "harbor patrol" officer is a "peace officer" under Penal Code § 830.33(b) absent proof the officer's primary duty is law enforcement | People: § 830.33(b) provides alternative paths; an officer may be a peace officer when performing "necessary duties" even if law enforcement is not the primary duty | Pennington: § 830.33(b) requires the officer’s primary duty be law enforcement to qualify as a peace officer | Held: § 830.33(b) requires the officer’s primary duty to be enforcement of the law; Miller correctly interpreted the statute |
| Whether the People proved Officer Hubbard was a peace officer at trial | People: evidence of uniform, badge, weapons, training, patrol duties and connection to police dept. sufficed | Pennington: People failed to introduce evidence showing Hubbard’s primary duty was law enforcement | Held: People failed to prove this essential element; conviction reversed for § 243(b) battery |
| Whether the trial court could preclude argument and instruct the jury that harbor patrol officers are peace officers as a matter of law | People: such instruction was proper | Pennington: pretrial ruling and instruction removed an essential element from the jury’s consideration | Held: Instruction was erroneous in context because the People had to prove primary-duty element; error required reversal of § 243(b) conviction |
| Whether any error was harmless given other convictions (e.g., § 69) and sentencing/probation | People: errors were harmless because other evidence and convictions remained | Pennington: failure to prove element mandates reversal on that count | Held: Errors not harmless for the § 243(b) battery count; other convictions/ probation order largely unaffected |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Miller, 164 Cal.App.4th 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (interpreting § 830.33(b) to require primary duty of law enforcement for peace officer status)
- County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn., 3 Cal.4th 873 (Cal. 1992) (chapter 4.5 defines who may be peace officers; local authorities cannot confer peace officer status beyond the chapter)
- Gauthier v. City of Red Bluff, 34 Cal.App.4th 1441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (statute’s "primary duty" language requires primary law-enforcement duty for peace-officer status)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)