People v. Payne CA5
F079012
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 21, 2021Background
- Randy Lynn Payne (now 58) was sentenced in 1997 as a third-strike offender to 25 years-to-life for felony evading and felony petty theft (theft with prior); the petty-theft term was later stayed under § 654.
- Defendant repeatedly sought resentencing under changed law: Proposition 36 (2012) (denied in 2013), and later relief under Proposition 47 (2014) and Romero reconsideration.
- In Sept. 2018 counsel filed a petition invoking the Buycks full-resentencing rule; defense counsel sought more time to gather evidence.
- In early 2019 Payne sought to discharge counsel and represent himself; the court accepted his Faretta waiver without an adequate on-the-record advisement and without confirming he read/understood the waiver form.
- The court reduced the petty-theft conviction to a misdemeanor under Prop. 47 but declined to resentence him as a second striker; Payne appealed. The People conceded the Faretta inquiry was inadequate and prejudicial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court adequately accepted a Faretta waiver for a postconviction/resentencing proceeding | People conceded the court erred by allowing self-representation without advising Payne of risks or confirming understanding of the waiver form | Payne argued he validly waived counsel and proceeded pro se for his Prop. 47/resentencing petition | Court held waiver was invalid—trial court failed to advise of risks or confirm understanding; reversible error and remanded for further proceedings |
| Whether the Faretta error was prejudicial (Chapman standard) | People argued outcome likely would be the same or that Payne limited relief sought | Payne argued lack of counsel harmed his ability to present changed circumstances supporting resentencing | Court accepted People’s concession of prejudice: unresolved whether result would have been same; remand required |
| Whether the court applied the correct legal standard re: jurisdiction and ability to fully resentence under Buycks/Hubbard | People contended this issue is moot given Faretta reversal | Payne argued the judge misapprehended jurisdiction and wrongly refused to exercise discretion to resentence as a second striker | Moot on appeal; remanded so trial court can address on proper record |
| Eighth Amendment disproportionality/cruel-and-unusual challenge to life term | People argued law-of-the-case forecloses relitigation of sentence constitutionality (earlier appeal upheld sentence) | Payne renewed Eighth Amendment challenge to his life sentence as grossly disproportionate | Court held claim barred by law-of-the-case; earlier appellate decision upholding sentence controls |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizes constitutional right to self-representation and requires an intelligent waiver)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-error standard for constitutional waiver errors)
- People v. Burgener, 46 Cal.4th 231 (2009) (review of whether waiver was knowing/intelligent; postconviction Faretta inquiry need not be as exhaustive but must warn of hazards)
- People v. Ruffin, 12 Cal.App.5th 536 (2017) (execution of a Faretta form alone does not establish an intelligent waiver)
- People v. Butler, 47 Cal.4th 814 (2009) (Faretta error is reversible per se; Chapman analysis applies)
- People v. Buycks, 5 Cal.5th 857 (2018) (full-resentencing rule: courts may modify every aspect of sentence when resentencing under Prop. 47)
- People v. Hubbard, 27 Cal.App.5th 9 (2018) (discusses scope of full resentencing and reconsideration of prior sentencing decisions)
- People v. Romero, 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) (trial courts have discretion under § 1385 to dismiss strike priors in the interests of justice)