People v. Patterson CA4/1, D077938

Background

Undercover vice detectives detained 16‑year‑old "Precious" during a prostitution sting and turned her over to the Human Trafficking Task Force.
Detectives recovered two phones from Precious (a Samsung and a black ZTE); Task Force detectives obtained oral and written consent from Precious to search both phones.
The ZTE phone contained texts with a contact labeled "EL" and a video of Precious performing sexual acts; police linked "EL" to defendant Kirk Patterson and recovered additional incriminating media from Patterson’s car.
Patterson was charged with multiple offenses including commercial sex trafficking of a minor and possession of child pornography; he moved to suppress evidence derived from the ZTE phone at the preliminary hearing.
The trial court denied suppression, finding (among other things) that Precious had apparent authority to consent and that her consent was voluntary; Patterson’s trial counsel did not renew the suppression motion at trial.
On appeal Patterson claimed ineffective assistance for failing to renew the suppression motion; the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding the suppression challenge lacked merit (apparent authority and voluntariness) and renewal would have been futile.

Issues

Issue	People's Argument	Patterson's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not renewing a preliminarily‑denied suppression motion at trial	Counsel need not pursue a futile claim; suppression was correctly denied so no deficiency or prejudice	Counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the suppression issue for appeal	No ineffective assistance: suppression ruling was correct, so not renewing would be futile
Whether Precious had authority to consent to a warrantless search of the ZTE phone (apparent authority)	Precious possessed and used the phone, gave written/oral consent; officers reasonably believed she had authority	Phone belonged to Patterson; Precious was a minor and may have been controlled by a pimp, so she lacked authority	Apparent authority was reasonable based on possession, conduct, and detectives’ observations; consent valid
Whether Precious's consent was voluntary	Consent was given after Miranda warnings, was expressly requested, and detectives did not coerce her	Precious was young, intoxicated, and questioned by two adult male detectives at a station—consent not voluntary	Consent was voluntary under the totality of circumstances; trial court’s credibility findings supported this
Whether Riley v. California eliminated the third‑party/consent exception for cell phones	Riley does not eliminate consent exception; other exceptions to warrant requirement remain	Riley recognized heightened privacy interests in cell phones (implying greater protection)	Riley precludes only search‑incident‑to‑arrest for phones; consent exception still applies to cell phone searches

Key Cases Cited

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (U.S. 2014) (search‑incident‑to‑arrest rule for phones limited; does not abolish other exceptions)
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (U.S. 1990) (apparent authority measured by objective reasonable belief of officers)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (voluntariness of consent judged under totality of circumstances)
Matlock v. United States, 415 U.S. 164 (U.S. 1974) (third‑party/common authority can validate consent to search)
People v. Boyer, 38 Cal.4th 412 (Cal. 2006) (consent must be voluntary to validate warrantless searches)
People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal.3d 891 (Cal. 1978) (need to renew suppression motion after preliminary hearing to preserve issue)
People v. Caro, 7 Cal.5th 463 (Cal. 2019) (appellate review of ineffective assistance claim requires addressing merits of omitted suppression motion)
People v. Bell, 7 Cal.5th 70 (Cal. 2019) (strategic decisions not to pursue futile motions do not establish ineffective assistance)