People v. Patterson
2016 IL App (1st) 101573-B
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- Ronald Patterson committed aggravated criminal sexual assault at age 15 in 2008; tried and convicted in criminal court after automatic transfer under the Juvenile Court Act then in effect.
- PSI and treatment records showed significant childhood behavioral problems, psychiatric treatment, medication, and an IQ of 72; limited prior contacts with police.
- Trial court found aggravating factors, no mitigation, and imposed consecutive terms totaling 36 years; convictions were later affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court on other grounds.
- After briefing on remand, the General Assembly amended the Juvenile Court Act (Public Act 99-258), raising the mandatory-transfer age from 15 to 16 and adding limits on retroactivity for discretionary-transfer provisions, effective Jan. 1, 2016.
- The panel held the amendment to the mandatory-transfer provision (section 5-130) is procedural and therefore applies retroactively to cases on direct appeal; because Patterson never received a juvenile transfer hearing under the pre-amendment discretionary-transfer procedures, the court vacated his sentence and remanded to juvenile court to allow the State to seek a transfer under section 5-805 (2008).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Patterson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2015 amendment to section 5-130 (raising mandatory-transfer age from 15 to 16) applies to cases on direct appeal | The amendment should be applied prospectively; legislature intended nonretroactive effect | The amendment is procedural and should apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal | The amendment is procedural and applies retroactively to cases on direct appeal |
| Whether the amendment to section 5-130 is substantive (affecting vested rights) or procedural | The amendment affects sentencing and thus is substantive; State has vested right to criminal-court sentencing | Transfer rules are procedural; parties have no vested right to a particular forum or procedure | The amendment is procedural, not substantive; no vested right to a particular remedy or procedure |
| Whether Patterson must have had a transfer hearing under the discretionary-transfer statute in effect when he was prosecuted | State notes lack of explicit retroactivity language for section 5-130 and argues continuation of adult prosecution | Patterson lacked any hearing under section 5-805 (2008) because 5-130 mandated automatic transfer in 2008; the amendment requires a transfer hearing | Because automatic-transfer no longer governs, remand to juvenile court for possible transfer hearing under 2008 section 5-805 is required |
| Whether the appellate court could apply the amendment despite the supreme court mandate | State argues lower court must follow the supreme court mandate exactly | Patterson and court cite authority that intervening statutory change may alter mandate effect | Court may consider intervening legislative change and apply the amendment on remand; rehearing denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82 (Illinois 2003) (distinguishes substantive vs. procedural amendments for temporal reach; procedural amendments may apply retroactively)
- Glisson v. Illinois Dep’t of Corrections, 202 Ill. 2d 499 (Illinois 2002) (applies Statute on Statutes to retroactivity of procedural changes for cases on direct appeal)
- People v. Clark, 119 Ill. 2d 1 (Illinois 1987) (remand to juvenile court for proper transfer hearing when statutory procedures were not followed)
- Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967) (intervening statutory change can alter effect of a higher court mandate)
- People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188 (Illinois 2007) (effective date language may evidence legislative intent against retroactivity)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (U.S. 2005) (limitations on sentencing juveniles due to youth characteristics)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (life without parole for juveniles in nonhomicide cases unconstitutional)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; courts must consider youth factors)