People v. Patrick
2011 IL 111666
| Ill. | 2011Background
- Defendant Tyron L. Patrick was convicted of reckless homicide and three counts of failing to report an accident; he was sentenced to concurrent terms and consecutive terms as described.
- Defendant filed pro se posttrial motions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including a request for an evidentiary hearing with appointed counsel outside the public defender’s office.
- The trial court refused to consider the pro se ineffectiveness claims as untimely under 725 ILCS 5/116-1(b), and did not conduct a Krankel-style preliminary inquiry.
- Appellate Court vacated some convictions on other grounds, but remanded for a Krankel-type preliminary examination of the pro se ineffectiveness claims.
- State challenged jurisdiction and timing issues for the pro se motions and appeals; the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether Krankel-type claims are governed by common-law procedures and exempt from 116-1(b).
- Court held: trial court must conduct a preliminary factual inquiry into pro se ineffective assistance claims, and Krankel procedure applies before notice of appeal; 116-1(b) does not bar such inquiries when raised pro se pre-appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court owed a duty to conduct a preliminary factual inquiry into pro se IAC claims. | Patrick relies on Krankel to require inquiry regardless of 116-1(b) timing. | State argues 116-1(b) timing bars untimely pro se motions. | Yes; trial court must conduct preliminary inquiry. |
| Whether Krankel procedure can apply to claims arising from sentencing. | Krankel should cover IAC claims arising at sentencing. | Krankel limited to trial-stage IAC; not all sentencing claims. | Krankel applies to IAC claims arising from trial or sentencing, where appropriate. |
| Whether 116-1(b) timing can be reconciled with Krankel. | Krankel exempts pre-appeal IAC claims from 30-day requirement. | 116-1(b) governs written motions for new trial. | Yes; 116-1(b) not controlling for pro se IAC claims raised pre-appeal; remand for preliminary inquiry. |
| Jurisdictional sufficiency of notices of appeal to review pro se motions. | Appeals properly identify judgment; jurisdiction exists. | Notices may be deficient, could deprive appellate authority. | Appellate jurisdiction proper; notices sufficient to review judgment. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (Ill. 1984) (creation of Krankel procedure for pro se IAC claims)
- People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68 (Ill. 2003) (limits on appointing new counsel after pro se IAC claim)
- People v. Curry, 178 Ill.2d 509 (Ill. 1997) (remedial tailoring of remedy for IAC during plea negotiations)
- People v. Sims, 167 Ill.2d 483 (Ill. 1995) (Krankel applied to sentencing IAC claims)
- People v. Jocko, 239 Ill.2d 87 (Ill. 2010) (Krankel procedure narrows issues on appeal)
- People v. Lewis, 234 Ill.2d 32 (Ill. 2009) (jurisdictional scope of notices of appeal)
- General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill.2d 163 (Ill. 2011) (notice of appeal considerations; liberal construction allowed)
- People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill.2d 45 (Ill. 2005) (role of motion character based on relief sought)
- People v. Williams, 204 Ill.2d 191 (Ill. 2003) (speedy-trial and related remedies in IAC context)
- People v. Mayo, 198 Ill.2d 530 (Ill. 2002) (impact of speedy-trial violations on convictions)