456 P.3d 437
Cal.2020Background
- In 2006 Partee reported a rental car stolen and, during a recorded LAPD homicide interview, implicated her brother, cousin, and two friends in a murder and said she would not testify because of loyalty and safety concerns.
- Partee was later subpoenaed and, after being found in 2015, held as a material witness; the DA granted her use immunity at a preliminary hearing but she still refused to testify and was held in contempt.
- The murder charges against the four suspects were dismissed twice after Partee declined to testify; she ultimately was criminally charged with four felony counts of accessory after the fact (Pen. Code § 32) and one misdemeanor count of contempt (Pen. Code § 166(a)(6)).
- At trial Partee testified about past retaliation, threats, fear for her and her child’s safety, and family obligations as reasons for silence; a jury convicted her on the four accessory counts and the contempt count but found gang enhancements not true.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the accessory convictions, reasoning that refusal to testify despite a subpoena and immunity was affirmative assistance because she had a duty to testify.
- The California Supreme Court reversed the four accessory convictions, holding that a witness’s refusal to testify in the face of a valid subpoena—while punishable as contempt—does not by itself constitute the "harbors, conceals, or aids" element of § 32 requiring overt or affirmative assistance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a witness’s refusal to testify under subpoena and use immunity can satisfy the § 32 element that the accused "harbors, conceals or aids" a principal | Partee’s silence after a legal duty to testify amounted to affirmative assistance that helped suspects avoid trial and punishment | Silence—even when a legal duty exists—is mere passive nondisclosure, at most contempt, and not the overt or affirmative assistance § 32 requires | No; refusal to testify under subpoena, by itself, does not satisfy § 32’s requirement of overt or affirmative assistance; accessory convictions reversed |
| Whether the presence of a subpoena and grant of immunity (i.e., a legal duty) or the witness’s intent to help principals converts silence into affirmative assistance | Subpoena/immunity create a duty that transforms silence into an overt act; specific intent to help makes silence actionable under § 32 | Duty and intent are distinct elements; intent to help does not convert inaction into the requisite affirmative act | No; duty and mens rea are separate—intent alone cannot change the nature of inaction into overt assistance under § 32 |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Nuckles, 56 Cal.4th 601 (2013) (sets out § 32 elements and requires "overt or affirmative assistance")
- People v. Duty, 269 Cal.App.2d 97 (1969) (upheld § 32 conviction where defendant gave affirmative false alibi to investigators)
- In re I.M., 125 Cal.App.4th 1195 (2005) (upheld accessory conviction based on misleading statements to police intended to shield principal)
- People v. Plengsangtip, 148 Cal.App.4th 825 (2007) (affirmative misrepresentations to police supported § 32 conviction; mere refusal to speak does not)
- People v. Nguyen, 21 Cal.App.4th 518 (1993) (reversed accessory convictions where evidence showed only refusal to talk or downplaying—insufficient for § 32)
- People v. Garnett, 129 Cal. 364 (1900) (holding mere silence after knowledge of a felony is insufficient to make one an accessory)
- People v. Linville, 27 Cal.App.5th 919 (2018) (disposing of vehicle used in murder is paradigmatic affirmative assistance)
- People v. Gunn, 197 Cal.App.3d 408 (1987) (examples of overt assistance: driving principal away, suggesting concealment of weapon)
- Shortridge v. Municipal Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 611 (1984) (rejects construction of § 32 that would criminalize mere passive nondisclosure)
