People v. Palmer, 2021 IL 125621

In 1998 Charles Palmer was tried and convicted of first-degree murder for beating William Helmbacher to death; key trial evidence included testimony by Ray Taylor and later-tested blood on Palmer’s shoes.
Trial evidence: no forced entry, victim had defensive wounds and a hammer nearby; Taylor testified Palmer admitted killing the victim; initial shoe testing later revealed victim’s blood beneath shoe mesh.
Postconviction DNA testing (years later) of fingernail scrapings and hairs excluded Palmer as the source and identified DNA from an unknown contributor.
After the new DNA results the State conceded insufficient evidence, vacated and dismissed the charges, and Palmer was released.
Palmer petitioned under 735 ILCS 5/2-702 for a certificate of innocence; the trial and appellate courts denied the petition after the State argued Palmer could still be guilty as an accomplice (accountability).
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) subsection 2-702(g)(3) requires proof of innocence as the offense was charged, and (2) the State was judicially estopped from asserting an accountability theory newly in the certificate proceeding.

Issue	Palmer's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Construction of 735 ILCS 5/2-702(g)(3): scope of "innocent of the offenses charged"	Petitioner must prove innocence of the specific factual offense as charged in the indictment (the manner actually alleged and tried).	Petitioner must prove innocence of the statutory offense (e.g., first-degree murder) in all forms, including as principal or accomplice.	Court: "offenses charged in the indictment or information" means innocence of the offense as charged and prosecuted (the factual allegations in the charging document/trial).
Judicial estoppel: may the State assert a new accountability theory in the certificate proceeding after prevailing at trial on a contrary theory?	State is barred from changing positions; it prevailed at trial on a theory Palmer was the principal and cannot now assert an inconsistent accountability theory.	State contends the change is justified by postconviction DNA testing and thus is an honest change based on new evidence.	Court: The State was judicially estopped from asserting the accountability theory here because the DNA evidence was not "new" in investigative terms and the State previously asserted the contrary position at trial.

People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332 (2003) (accountability is an alternative manner of proving a substantive offense, not a separate offense)
Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432 (2015) (purpose and factors for judicial estoppel; protects integrity of judicial process)
People v. Runge, 234 Ill. 2d 68 (2009) (judicial estoppel may be relaxed where new facts objectively justify a changed position)
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (doctrine and policy considerations for judicial estoppel)
People v. Ruscitti, 27 Ill. 2d 545 (1963) (indicting as principal is sufficient even if evidence shows defendant was an accomplice)
People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711 (2012) (standard for "newly discovered" evidence in postconviction innocence claims)