People v. Palen
2016 IL App (4th) 140228
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- In Sept. 2012 Scott Palen was charged with attempt (residential burglary) and possession of burglary tools based on an incident on Sept. 5, 2012.
- At the first trial (Sept. 30, 2013) the court and counsel selected and swore eight jurors before recessing; the next day the prosecutor Karen Tharp was unavailable due to a death in her family and the trial judge, sua sponte and without consulting counsel, declared a mistrial.
- Palen was retried in Nov. 2013, convicted of attempt (residential burglary) and possession of burglary tools, and sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 (extended) and 6 years.
- The State had introduced Palen’s 2009 residential burglary conviction for limited purposes (intent/knowledge) and the trial court gave a limiting instruction; police and eyewitness testimony tied Palen to the Sept. 2012 attempt and tools were recovered in his truck.
- On appeal Palen argued (1) the mistrial after eight jurors were sworn violated double jeopardy, (2) improper admission of other-crimes evidence, (3) sentencing errors including improper extended term on the lesser offense, and (4) the trial court failed to conduct a Krankel inquiry into his pro se ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did jeopardy attach when only 8 jurors were sworn so that the mistrial barred retrial? | Jeopardy attaches only when the jury is empaneled and sworn; because the court had announced it would select 12 jurors plus alternates, empanelment was not complete. | The swearing of a partial jury (the 8 jurors) put Palen in jeopardy and the sua sponte mistrial lacked manifest necessity, so double jeopardy bars retrial. | Jeopardy had not attached because the court had indicated it would empanel 12 jurors and alternates; swearing only 8 did not complete empanelment, so retrial was permissible. |
| Was Palen’s 2009 residential burglary conviction improperly admitted as other-crimes evidence? | The conviction was admissible for intent and knowledge, with a limiting instruction, and corroborated by conduct evidence. | The prior conviction was impermissible propensity evidence and should have been excluded. | The prior conviction was admissible for intent/knowledge; even if error, the evidence against Palen was overwhelming, so no reversal. |
| Did the trial court err in sentencing, including imposing an extended term on the lesser offense? | The court argues sentencing was within discretion but concedes error in imposing an extended term on the Class 4 offense when a Class 2 offense was the most serious. | Sentencing court made improper factual findings, failed adequately to weigh mitigation, and unlawfully gave an extended term on the lesser felony. | The trial court did not abuse its sentencing discretion generally, but erred by imposing an extended 6-year term on the Class 4 burglary-tools count; that sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing. |
| Did the court err by failing to conduct a Krankel inquiry into Palen’s pro se ineffective-assistance claims? | The State: Palen forfeited Krankel protection because his letter was addressed to the appellate clerk, was not brought to the trial court’s attention, and he did not raise the claims at the sentencing hearing. | Palen contends his pro se letter triggered a Krankel inquiry and appointment of new counsel. | No Krankel inquiry required: Palen’s pro se letter was filed with the appeals clerk, not presented to the trial court, and he failed to bring the claims to the court’s attention, so the claim was forfeited. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (establishing that in a jury trial jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn)
- Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (recognizing court authority to discharge a jury for manifest necessity)
- Dreyer v. People, 188 Ill. 40 (1900) (Illinois recognition that a jury may be discharged when necessity requires)
- People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171 (other-crimes evidence admissible for non-propensity purposes and reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192 (1984) (extended-term sentences may be imposed only on convictions in the most serious class)