People v. Page, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786

Background

Timothy Wayne Page was serving a felony sentence after pleading guilty in 2012 to Vehicle Code §10851 (taking/driving a vehicle without consent) and other offenses; the §10851 term was a 6‑year principal term.
Proposition 47 (effective Nov. 5, 2014) created Penal Code §490.2, making "obtaining any property by theft" of value $950 or less petty theft (a misdemeanor), and §1170.18, authorizing resentencing for persons serving felony sentences who "would have been guilty of a misdemeanor" under the act.
Page filed an uncounseled petition for recall/resentencing under §1170.18; the superior court denied it and the Court of Appeal affirmed, holding §10851 convictions are not affected by Proposition 47.
The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a felony conviction under Vehicle Code §10851 can qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47 when the underlying conduct was automobile theft of property valued at $950 or less.
The Court recognized §10851 can encompass both theft (intent to permanently deprive) and non‑theft conduct (temporary taking or posttheft driving) and held that only §10851 convictions based on theft of a vehicle worth ≤ $950 are eligible for resentencing under §1170.18.
Because Page’s petition lacked facts showing his §10851 conviction was based on theft or that the vehicle value was ≤ $950, denial of his petition was proper, but he may file a new petition alleging and proving eligibility.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §1170.18 permits resentencing for felony convictions under Veh. Code §10851 when the conviction was for vehicle theft ≤ $950	People: §1170.18’s list of statutes shows voters did not intend to include Veh. Code §10851	Page: §490.2 covers "any property obtained by theft," and §10851 can be a theft offense, so §1170.18 relief should extend to theft convictions under §10851	Court: Eligible if the §10851 conviction was based on theft of the vehicle and vehicle value was ≤ $950; §10851 convictions are not categorically ineligible
Whether §490.2 applies only to statutes expressly labeled as "grand theft"	People: §490.2’s opening clause refers to provisions defining grand theft, and §10851 is not such a provision	Page: §490.2 covers "obtaining any property by theft" regardless of the label; vehicle theft under §10851 falls within that language	Court: §490.2 reaches theft of an automobile under §10851; the opening clause does not limit the independent remedial clause
What showing a petitioner must make to establish eligibility under §1170.18 for a §10851 conviction	People: (implicit) reliance on statutory text and records	Page: petitioner must show conviction was for theft and property value ≤ $950	Court: Burden on petitioner to plead and, where possible, prove conviction was based on theft (not posttheft driving or temporary taking) and vehicle value ≤ $950; record of conviction often dispositive
Effect of petitioner’s uncounseled, fact‑poor petition	People: upholds denial given lack of proof	Page: entitlement to opportunity to prove eligibility	Court: Denial was proper on the record, but dismissal is without prejudice; petitioner may file a new petition with necessary allegations/evidence

Key Cases Cited

People v. Garza, 35 Cal.4th 866 (2005) (explains §10851 can be based on theft or on non‑theft posttheft driving and a §10851 theft conviction constitutes a theft conviction)
People v. Romanowski, 2 Cal.5th 903 (2017) (discusses §1170.18 resentencing procedure and burden to establish eligibility)
People v. Riel, 22 Cal.4th 1153 (2000) (theft requires intent to permanently deprive owner of possession)
People v. Van Orden, 9 Cal.App.5th 1277 (2017) (applies §490.2 to automobile theft and interprets §490.2’s independent remedial clause)
People v. Kehoe, 33 Cal.2d 711 (1949) (discusses substantial break doctrine distinguishing initial theft from later posttheft driving)