People v. Pabello, 145 N.E.3d 705

Background

Defendant Benjamin Pabello was convicted of two counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; his direct appeal was previously affirmed.
He filed a pro se postconviction petition that advanced to the second stage; counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate and a supplemental petition alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress defendant’s statements because his Miranda waiver was invalid due to limited education and poor English.
At the third-stage evidentiary hearing, defendant testified he attended only elementary school in Mexico (5th–6th grade), spoke mainly Spanish, asked for an interpreter during interrogation, and claimed limited English; trial counsel testified he and defendant mainly spoke English, that defendant never requested an interpreter, and that the interrogation video showed defendant speaking and answering in English.
The trial court reviewed the interrogation video, found no language barrier, concluded defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights, and denied the postconviction petition.
On appeal, Pabello argued postconviction counsel failed to comply with Rule 651(c) at the third stage by not presenting sufficient evidence of his limited education; the appellate court held Rule 651(c) does not govern third-stage performance and evaluated counsel under a general reasonableness standard (using Strickland as a benchmark), concluding counsel’s performance was reasonable and affirming.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) apply to counsel’s performance at a third-stage postconviction hearing?	Rule 651(c) duties were satisfied at second stage; the rule does not govern third-stage conduct.	Rule 651(c)’s duties (including providing evidentiary support) continue through the third stage; counsel failed to comply.	Rule 651(c) does not govern third-stage hearings; third-stage performance is judged by a general reasonableness standard.
What standard measures postconviction counsel’s assistance at the third stage?	Use a general reasonableness standard; Strickland is a useful benchmark.	Rule 651(c) is the controlling measure of reasonable assistance throughout proceedings.	Apply general reasonableness; if counsel meets Strickland, that conclusively satisfies the lesser statutory standard.
Was postconviction counsel ineffective at the third stage for not presenting more evidence of defendant’s limited education/English?	Counsel presented claimant’s affidavit/testimony and relied on the interrogation video and trial counsel’s testimony; performance was reasonable and non-prejudicial.	Counsel should have offered additional school records/grades or emphasized education gaps to undermine the Miranda waiver.	Counsel’s presentation was not deficient in a way that prejudiced Pabello; additional proof of schooling would not likely change the waiver finding.
Was Pabello’s Miranda waiver knowing and intelligent given his education and English skills?	Totality of circumstances (video, testimony, work history, ability to converse in English) show a valid waiver.	Limited schooling and limited English rendered the waiver invalid.	Waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of circumstances; suppression motion likely would have failed, so no prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishes Miranda warnings and that waiver must be knowing and voluntary)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444 (2002) (postconviction proceedings remedy constitutional violations not adjudicated on direct appeal)
People v. Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d 319 (2009) (postconviction collateral-attack nature explained)
People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (2006) (defendant’s burden at third-stage hearing)
People v. Lester, 261 Ill. App. 3d 1075 (1994) (third-stage evidentiary hearing can develop facts not in trial record)
People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351 (1990) (right to postconviction counsel derives from the Act and is limited)
People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264 (1992) (postconviction counsel must provide a reasonable level of assistance)
People v. Richmond, 188 Ill. 2d 376 (1999) (ways to show compliance with Rule 651(c))
People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37 (2007) (failure to comply with Rule 651(c) requires remand without prejudice analysis)
People v. Marshall, 375 Ill. App. 3d 670 (2007) (held Rule 651(c) does not apply once petition advances to third stage)
People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999) (discusses Rule 651(c) obligations where petition dismissed at second stage)
People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227 (1993) (addresses second-stage dismissal context)
People v. Young, 2018 IL 122598 (2018) (overruled aspects of some appellate decisions cited on related points)
People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006 (2016) (Rule 651(c) is a vehicle to ensure reasonable assistance but not the exclusive measure)