People v. Nixon, 53 N.E.3d 301

Defendant Eric L. Nixon was charged with aggravated discharge of a firearm and being an armed habitual criminal arising from an April 11, 2012 incident in which shots were fired toward the residence where victim Candice Bradley was staying; bullets hit Bradley’s parked car.
The State sought to admit evidence of a 2006 incident in which defendant shot Bradley, arguing relevance to motive, intent, relationship, and admissibility under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 (domestic-violence propensity evidence).
The trial court admitted limited testimony and two photographs from the 2006 shooting under section 115-7.4 and for non-propensity purposes (motive/relationship/intent), but precluded introduction of evidence of conviction from that incident.
Bradley became unavailable to testify at trial; the State moved to admit her out-of-court statements under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine (Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)), presenting recorded jail calls in which defendant solicited others to influence witnesses and testimony.
The trial court found by a preponderance that defendant’s conduct procured Bradley’s unavailability and admitted her hearsay statements; a jury convicted Nixon of both charged counts, the convictions were merged, and he was sentenced as an armed habitual criminal to 24 years.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of 2006 shooting evidence (other-crimes)	Evidence of the prior 2006 shooting is admissible under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.4 and as probative of motive, intent, relationship; probative value outweighs prejudice.	The 2012 act targeted Bradley’s car not her person, so it was not domestic violence; prior-shooting evidence unduly prejudiced jury by showing propensity.	Court affirmed admission: 2012 conduct qualified as domestic violence (physical abuse/harassment), 2006 evidence was sufficiently similar and probative, and prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value.
Admission of Bradley’s out-of-court statements (confrontation)	Defendant’s recorded jail calls and solicitation of others to influence Bradley established by a preponderance that he engaged in wrongdoing intended to and that did procure her unavailability; forfeiture-by-wrongdoing extinguishes Confrontation Clause claim.	Bradley’s statements were testimonial; defendant did not procure her unavailability — she initially met police and expressed no immediate threats, and jail calls did not contain direct threats to her.	Court held the State met its burden under Ill. R. Evid. 804(b)(5): defendant’s actions induced Bradley’s unavailability, so admission did not violate the Sixth Amendment.

People v. Dabbs, 239 Ill. 2d 277 (2010) (interpreting admission of other-crimes evidence in domestic-violence context)
People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159 (2003) (standards for admissibility of other-crimes evidence and abuse-of-discretion review)
People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353 (1991) (general rule excluding propensity evidence and legitimate nonpropensity uses)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause principles re testimonial statements)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine and its relation to confrontation)
People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246 (2007) (Illinois recognition of federal forfeiture doctrine and burden of proof)
People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d 74 (2010) (discussing common-law forfeiture and codification)
People v. McCarthy, 132 Ill. 2d 331 (1989) (prior bad acts probative of intent to harm)
People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36 (1999) (other-crimes evidence probative where it shows continuing hostility and motive)
People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414 (1995) (presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions)