People v. Nieto
2016 IL App (1st) 121604
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- In 2005, 17-year-old Michael Nieto shot into a Jeep, killing Richard Soria and injuring Israel Fernandez; jury convicted him of first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and a personal-firearm-discharge finding.
- PSI described a deprived upbringing, gang involvement (Latin Kings), limited education, prior juvenile offenses, daily marijuana use, and an accidental killing of his brother after the offense.
- At sentencing the trial court found multiple aggravating factors (gang conduct, multiple shots at unarmed victims, use of police scanners, likelihood of recurrence) but acknowledged Nieto’s young age and some potential for future redemption.
- Court imposed consecutive terms: 35 years (murder), 25 years (firearm enhancement), 18 years (aggravated battery) = 78 years total (de facto natural life; Nieto would be ~94 at discharge).
- Nieto filed a pro se Post-Conviction Hearing Act petition (pre-Miller) raising other claims; after Miller and Montgomery, he argued his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as applied to juveniles; the appellate court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, affirming dismissal of other Act claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Nieto) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nieto’s aggregate 78-year sentence is a de facto life-without-parole sentence for Eighth Amendment purposes | Sentence was discretionary and lawful under Illinois sentencing statutes; no Miller relief because not a mandatory LWOP | Aggregate term (will keep him incarcerated essentially for life) triggers Miller protections; trial court failed to account for youth-related mitigating characteristics | Court held the aggregate sentence functioned as de facto life without parole and vacated sentence for resentencing under Miller/Montgomery principles |
| Whether Miller challenges raised for the first time on appeal are forfeited | Forfeiture rules bar new as-applied challenges raised first on appeal | Miller/Montgomery create substantive, retroactive rights enabling collateral or appellate review despite usual forfeiture | Court followed Davis/Montgomery reasoning: Miller is retroactive; juvenile Miller claims may be considered though forfeiture doctrine is limited in this context |
| Whether Miller applies only to mandatory LWOP or also discretionary/de facto life terms | Miller prohibits mandatory LWOP for juveniles; discretionary aggregate term is permissible if sentencing considered youth | Miller and Montgomery require consideration of youth and bar life-like sentences for all but the rare permanently incorrigible juvenile | Court held Miller/Montgomery require sentencing courts to account for youth even when sentence is discretionary and may bar de facto life terms |
| Remedy required when sentencing fails to reflect Miller factors | No relief if sentence was discretionary and record shows consideration of youth | Where record shows failure to heed Miller—youth and attendant characteristics—vacate and remand for resentencing | Court vacated Nieto’s sentence and remanded for resentencing to allow proper consideration of juvenile characteristics |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (constitutional prohibition on death penalty for juveniles)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life-without-parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders prohibited)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. _ (Miller announced a substantive rule; retroactive effect in collateral proceedings)
- McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir.: Miller requires age-relevant consideration even for discretionary de facto life sentences)