People v. Nere
2018 IL 122566
| Ill. | 2019Background
- On June 27, 2012, Augustina Taylor was found unresponsive after a party; items recovered from the bathroom included a bloodstained sock (DNA-matching Nere), a syringe, a glass pipe, and heroin residue.
- Defendant Jennifer Nere admitted delivering heroin and cocaine to Taylor shortly before Taylor went into the bathroom and later died; Taylor’s autopsy attributed death to heroin and cocaine intoxication, with 6‑MAM present (indicating recent heroin use).
- The State charged Nere with drug-induced homicide based solely on delivery of heroin under 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a).
- At trial the court gave IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15 (Supp. 2011) (causation—"contributing cause" language) and IPI No. 7.28 modified for the statute; defendant sought instructions requiring but‑for/proximate causation and wording limited to the act of delivering heroin.
- The jury convicted Nere; the appellate court affirmed but agreed with Burrage’s reasoning that but‑for causation is persuasive while nevertheless upholding the IPI instruction as reflecting Illinois law; this Court granted leave and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Nere) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IPI Crim. 4th No. 7.15 (Supp. 2011) ("contributing cause") correctly states causation under the Illinois drug‑induced homicide statute | IPI No. 7.15 correctly states longstanding Illinois causation law and mirrors homicide causation language; trial court properly used it | Burrage requires but‑for causation; the contributing‑cause instruction risks conviction without proof that the death would not have occurred but for defendant's delivery | Court held IPI No. 7.15 correctly states Illinois law; declined to adopt Burrage’s but‑for requirement for state homicide law and affirmed use of the contributing‑cause instruction |
| Whether Burrage’s critique of a contributing‑cause test (as incompatible with due process/beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt) requires abandoning Illinois contributing‑cause standard | Burrage is a federal statutory interpretation and its dictum criticizing contributing‑cause test is not binding; the Illinois statutory and precedent context supports contribution rule | Burrage’s reasoning is persuasive and raises grave due‑process concerns that should compel adoption of but‑for causation | Court rejected Burrage dictum as nonbinding and unpersuasive for changing Illinois law; retained contributing‑cause approach |
| Whether the causation instruction should have been modified to specify "delivery of heroin" (not "defendant's acts") when multiple substances were delivered | Other instructions limited the case to heroin; any imprecision was harmless because the charge and proofs focused on heroin delivery | The instruction’s generic "acts" wording risked juror consideration of uncharged conduct (cocaine) and should have been limited to the heroin delivery | Court agreed limited modification would be appropriate in such cases but held failure to modify here was harmless because instructions read together focused on heroin |
| Sufficiency of the evidence to prove drug‑induced homicide beyond a reasonable doubt | Medical and physical evidence established delivery of heroin by Nere and that Taylor died of heroin and cocaine intoxication; a rational juror could find heroin Nere delivered was a contributing cause of death | Evidence showed Taylor may have used heroin the prior day and cocaine alone can cause death; State failed to prove it was Nere’s heroin that caused death beyond a reasonable doubt | Court held evidence sufficient: toxicology, presence of 6‑MAM, sequence of events, and witness credibility supported finding that the heroin Nere delivered contributed to Taylor’s death |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. _, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014) (federal statute interpreted to require but‑for causation where distributed drug is not independently sufficient to cause death)
- People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132 (Ill. 1996) (Illinois accepts "contributing cause" theory: defendant’s act need only contribute to death)
- People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170 (Ill. 1987) (reiterating that defendant’s act need not be sole or immediate cause; intervening cause unconnected to defendant exonerates)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (discussing causal overdetermination in legal analysis)
- People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474 (Cal. 2010) (concurrent contribution defined as conduct "operative at the moment of the death and acted with another cause to produce the death")