People v. Nere
2017 IL App (2d) 141143
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- Defendant Jennifer Nere was convicted by a jury of unlawful delivery of heroin and drug‑induced homicide after Augustina Taylor died shortly after Nere delivered heroin (and cocaine) to her; autopsy found heroin metabolites (including 6‑MAM) and cocaine metabolites.
- At trial Nere admitted to detectives that she gave Taylor two bindles of heroin, a crack pipe and a syringe; a forensic pathologist opined Taylor died of heroin and cocaine intoxication due to intravenous drug use.
- The trial court used the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction (IPI Criminal 4th No. 7.15 (Supp. 2011)) on causation (requiring the defendant’s acts to be a “contributing cause”) and refused Nere’s proposed instructions that would have required but‑for (proximate) causation as articulated in Burrage v. United States.
- Nere also tendered: addict‑credibility instructions (based on Strother), possession/delivery/joint‑possession instructions, and a missing‑evidence inference instruction; the court refused each.
- Nere challenged the causation instruction, the refusals of the other tendered instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Nere) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction requiring that defendant’s "acts" be a "contributing cause" satisfied the statute’s "caused by" language | Pattern IPI instruction is correct under Illinois precedent (Kidd) and permits conviction when defendant’s acts contributed to death | Burrage requires but‑for causation (or, alternatively, independent sufficiency); the jury should have been instructed that heroin must be a but‑for/proximate cause of death | Court affirmed use of IPI instruction; but endorsed Burrage’s reasoning as persuasive and warned that "contributing cause" language is ambiguous and problematic; nonetheless no reversible error here |
| Whether the IPI wording "defendant’s acts" could mislead the jury to consider uncharged acts (delivery of cocaine) | Other instructions and closing argument focused the jury on the charged act (delivery of heroin) | The phrase is overbroad and could allow conviction based on uncharged conduct (cocaine delivery) | Court found the phrasing inapt but harmless because the instructions as a whole and arguments made clear the charged act was heroin delivery |
| Whether a narcotics‑addict credibility instruction (Strother) must be given | No such special instruction required when addiction was elicited and standard credibility instructions were given | Addiction requires special cautionary instruction because addicts are "habitual liars" | Refusal proper; Steidl controls—addict instruction not reversible error when addiction evidence is before jury and credibility is otherwise covered |
| Whether refusal of various pattern instructions on possession/ delivery/ implied agreement and missing investigative notes was error | State: those instructions were unnecessary, inapposite, or speculative | Nere: instructions were material and would have clarified possession, delivery and adverse inference from lost notes | Court affirmed refusals: possession instruction irrelevant to delivery charge; conspiracy/agreement instruction inapplicable; missing‑notes instruction unwarranted (notes were mere interview prompts and recorded interview existed) |
| Whether evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt | State: pathologist’s opinion (heroin + cocaine intoxication) plus timeline, defendant’s admissions, and 6‑MAM showing recent heroin use sufficed | Nere: evidence did not prove heroin (she supplied) was the but‑for cause — victim may have used leftover heroin earlier; expert testimony was equivocal | Court: viewing evidence in State’s favor, a rational jury could find heroin delivered by Nere contributed to the fatal heroin+cocaine intoxication; verdict upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (federal statute requires but‑for causation except where defendant’s act is an independently sufficient concurrent cause)
- People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132 (Ill. 1996) (Illinois Supreme Court discussing contribution to death where multiple wounds present)
- People v. Brackett, 117 Ill. 2d 170 (Ill. 1987) (defendant’s acts that set in motion chain of events contributing to death support homicide conviction)
- People v. Steidl, 142 Ill. 2d 204 (Ill. 1991) (refusal of addict‑credibility instruction not reversible where addiction was shown and general credibility instructions given)
- Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) ("substantial factor"/"but‑for" analysis: but‑for causation required except for multiple independently sufficient causes)