People v. Nelson
135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 312
Cal.2012Background
- A 15-year-old was tried as an adult and convicted of murder and multiple burglaries after custodial interrogation with Miranda warnings.
- Defendant initially waived Miranda rights; investigators proceeded with questioning for over five hours.
- During interrogation, defendant asked to speak to his mother multiple times and made other statements while being questioned.
- Defense moved to exclude custodial confessions; trial court admitted statements; Court of Appeal partially reversed, focusing on postwaiver invocations.
- California Supreme Court held that postwaiver invocations by a juvenile are governed by the Davis standard and that the statements were admissible.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard for postwaiver invocations by a juvenile | Nelson contends Davis applies to juveniles postwaiver. | Lessie/Fare approach should govern juveniles’ invocations after waiver. | Davis standard applies to juveniles postwaiver invocations. |
| Was the mother's communication an unequivocal invocation | Requests to call his mother could indicate invoking counsel or silence. | Requests were ambiguous and not a clear assertion of rights. | Not unambiguous; did not require halting interrogation. |
| Treatment of postwaiver invocations in juvenile context | Fare/Lessie analysis should determine invocation validity for juveniles. | Officers should assess invocation from the juvenile’s subjective state. | Court rejects Fare/Lessie in favor of objective Davis standard; keeps interrogation ongoing. |
| Reliability of waiver and voluntariness assessment | Waiver was knowing and voluntary given warnings and understanding. | Youthful status could undermine voluntariness. | Record supports a valid waiver and voluntariness. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (postwaiver invocation must be clear to be understood as request for attorney)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (clarity required for invocation of right to silence)
- Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (juvenile waiver considerations; totality of circumstances)
- Lessie v. Superior Court, 47 Cal.4th 1152 (2010) (juvenile invocation and waiver standards; not per se parent invocation)
- People v. Martinez, 47 Cal.4th 911 (2010) (unambiguous invocation after waiver; right to counsel/silence)
- People v. Williams, 49 Cal.4th 405 (2010) (waiver validity; factors in juvenile context)